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Preface
The growing interest in economics on the relationship between health and
economic growth arises from the persistence of a strong gap in living stan-
dards between rich and poor countries. Despite the remarkable progress in
health improvement in the last half century, mortality rates remain much
higher in poor countries, with a difference in life expectancy between rich
and poor countries of about 30 years (Cutler et al., 2006). This thesis fo-
cuses on this topic exploring the mechanisms by which health status affects
economic growth including the relevant interconnections with investment in
education, saving decisions and the intergenerational transmission of wealth.
The first chapter reviews the literature on the effects of mortality reduc-
tions on economic growth. The effect of longevity on economic growth has
been analyzed in two strands of literature. The first strand assumes exoge-
nous longevity and shows that increases in life expectancy improve economic
growth in poor countries while have a null or negative effect in rich countries.
The second strand identifies human capital as the principal factor affecting
longevity. These contributions show that poor countries can be trapped in
an equilibrium where life expectancy is low, education is low and fertility is
high whereas rich countries grow in the long-run.
A recent strand of literature focuses on the explicit effect of health spending
on life expectancy stressing the central role of both quantity and quality of
life on economic welfare. This studies emphasize the value of life and the
willingness to pay criterion to reduce the mortality risk.
The second chapter analyzes the relationship between human capital ac-
cumulation and life expectancy in a three periods overlapping generations
economy. Agents are altruistic and differ in their probability of surviving
to the second and third period. The model shows the existence of multiple
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steady states depending on the initial distribution of human capital. Poor
economies converge to a stable steady state where mortality is high and edu-
cation is low. On the other hand, rich economies show high levels of education
and high life expectancy.
The third chapter focuses on the direct effect of health spending on life
expectancy. In particular, we investigate the relationship between saving
and health expenditure in a two-periods overlapping generations economy.
Individuals work in the first period and live in retirement in the old age.
Health investment is an activity that increases the quality of life and the
probability of surviving from the first period to the next. Empirical evidence
shows that both health spending and saving, i.e. the consumption when old,
appear to be luxury goods but their behavior is strongly different according
to the level of per capita GDP. The share of saving on GDP appears to
be concave with respect to per capita GDP. On the opposite, the share of
health expenditure on GDP increases more than proportionally with respect
to per capita GDP. The ratio of saving to health investment is nonlinear
with respect to per capita GDP, i.e. first increasing and then decreasing.
In the proposed model, the ratio of health spending to saving is equal to
the ratio between the elasticity of the survival function and the elasticity
of the utility function. We prove that the model can replicate empirical
results if the elasticity of the utility function vary with the consumption, e.g.
agents have H.A.R.A. (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) preferences, and the
survival function presents a positive and increasing elasticity with respect to
health investment. Moreover we show that C.E.S. (constant elasticity of
substitution) preferences are not consistent with empirical evidence.
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Chapter 1
Mortality Decline and
Economic Growth
1.1 Introduction
For a long time, the theory of economic growth has given few relevance to
health as an important determinant of economic growth (Zon and Muysken,
2005). The pioneering contributions on health, mainly, focused on the charac-
terization of a demand’s function for health services (Grossman, 1972; Ehrlich
and Chuma, 1990) and, on the link which runs from better economic condi-
tions to mortality reductions (Preston, 1975), ignoring the relationship which
runs in the opposite direction, that is, from good health to economic growth.
The endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), identifying in
human capital the critical factor for economic growth, implicitly recognizes
the importance of health on economic growth. The paper by Fogel (1994) is
the first contribution on the effects of good health on economic growth:
Changes in health, in the composition of diet, and in clothing
and shelter can significantly affect the efficiency with which in-
gested energy is converted into work output. Reductions in the
incidence of infectious diseases increase the proportion of ingested
energy.....(Fogel (1994), p. 386)
....I believe, on the huge social investments made between 1870
and 1930, whose payoffs were not counted as a part of national
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income during the 1920’s and 1930’s even though they produced
a large stream of benefits during these decades.... (Fogel (1994),
p.388)
Good health and longevity affect economic growth through different chan-
nels such as the saving rate, human capital accumulation and agent’s produc-
tivity. In accordance with this point, the Word Health Organization report,
published in 2001, defines good health as the basis for job productivity, a
critical input for poverty reduction, economic growth and long-term devel-
opment (World Health Organization, 2001).
Bloom and Canning (2000) distinguish four ways in which health im-
provements can lead to economic growth: 1) productivity, i.e. healthier pop-
ulations tend to be physically more energetic and mentally more robust; 2)
education, that is people who live longer have stronger incentives to invest in
their human capital because they can enjoy the benefits of such investments
over longer periods. In addition, increased schooling promotes greater pro-
ductivity and, in turn, higher income; 3) investment in physical capital since
improvements in longevity create a greater need for people to save for their
retirement; 4) demographic transition from high to low rates of mortality
and fertility.
The interest for the effects of good health and longevity on economic
growth comes from the extraordinary gains in life expectancy in second half
of 20th century (see Figure 1.1). For example, between 1820 and 1870, in
England, life expectancy was about 41 years (Cutler et al., 2006), in the first
decade of the twentieth century was 50 years whereas in 2004 climbed to
about 78 years (W.D.I. 2006). Mortality reduction in France was broadly
similar to that in England. In the United States, life expectancy at birth
rose from 47 years in 1900 to 77 years in 2004 (W.D.I. 2006). In general,
a similar transition, with some moderate differences, took place in all de-
veloped countries (Cutler et al., 2006). Developing countries, also, show a
rapid increase in life expectancy which, however, stop to increase from 1980
(see Figure 1.1 and 1.2). From 1980, indeed, in several poor countries the
HIV/AIDS epidemic reverse the positive trend in life expectancy (Becker
et al., 2005; Cutler et al., 2006). In 1980, many developing countries showed
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a life expectancy at birth lower than in 1960 (Cutler et al., 2006) as we can
see in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 shows that income growth improves life expectancy and it has
a larger effect on mortality reduction among the poor than among the rich
countries. In addition, we can see a dimension of change in longevity which
is not associated with income, that is, for constant levels of income, life
expectancy has been rising from 1960 to 2002 (see also Soares (2005)). This
phenomenon was first noticed in the Preston (1975)’s seminal paper which
analyzed the data between 1930 and 1960. In particular, he argues that the
raise in income can explain only a part of the increase in life expectancy from
1930 to 1960 and attributes the shift upward of the relationship between life
expectancy and income to the improved public health measures, particularly
in middle income countries (Deaton, 2003). According to this approach,
Amartya Sen (1999) argues that the increase in life expectancy can not be
imputable only to the increase in the per capita income. For example, he
argues that the increase in life expectancy in England during the two wars
was imputable mostly to the strong and direct nutritional and public health
interventions that took place during and immediately after the World War
II.
Figure 1.2 shows the international relationship between life expectancy
at birth and per capita income in 2002. The size of the circles is proportional
to population, the black ones indicate Sub-Saharan countries and the gray
ones indicate east Asian and Pacific countries (source W.D.I. 2006). In 2002,
we can observe, a strong “divergence”in life expectancy at birth between rich
and poor countries: in many poor countries life expectancy at birth was lower
than 60 year whereas in rich countries life expectancy was about 80 years.
A critical point is the strong difference in the causes of mortality between
developed and developing countries. In poor countries there are a high infant
mortality rate and most deaths are caused by infectious disease. Health
delivery is often of low quality in both public and private sector. At the
same time many countries spend so little on health care that, no matter how
organized, it is unlikely to be effective (Cutler et al., 2006). In rich countries
the scenario is different, i.e. infant mortality rate is very low and most deaths
are caused by cancers and cardiovascular diseases (Cutler et al., 2006).
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Figure 1.1: Life Expectancy versus Log of GDP per capita (1960, 1980, 2002). Source:
World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank (2006).
This chapter is substantially devoted to review the literature which ana-
lyzes the effects of good health and longevity on country’s per capita GDP
over time. We begin with the study of economic growth models in which life
expectancy is assumed exogenous. We discuss, then, theoretical and empiri-
cal contributions which assume human capital as the principal determinant
of mortality reduction. Finally we review the recent literature which empha-
sizes the direct effect of health spending on life expectancy.
In particular, the structure of the chapter is outlined as follows. Section
2 discusses the strict relation between human capital and health. Section 3
reviews the literature which analyzes the effect of life expectancy on economic
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Figure 1.2: Life Expectancy versus Log of GDP per capita. Source: World Development
Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank (2006)
growth. In section 4 we analyze the recent health literature on the value of
life and the willingness to pay criterion to reduce the mortality risk. Finally,
section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
1.2 Health and Human capital
A large body of the literature emphasizes the strict relation and the simi-
larities between health investment and education (see for example Mushkin
(1962) and Becker (1962)).
Both health and education are the basis of human capital accumulation,
satisfy human wants and lead to higher standard of living. The paper of
Mushkin (1962) presents an extensive analysis of the relationship between
education and health:
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Health and education are joint investment is the same individual.
The individual is more effective in society as producers and as
consumers because of these investments (Mushkin (1962) p.130).
Lower levels of health and education reflect lower levels of economic devel-
opment (Shultz, 1999) and agent’s spending in health and education capital
presents positive externality for the entire community. Purchase of health
services for the prevention of contagious and infectious disease benefits the
community as a whole (Cutler et al., 2006).
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Figure 1.3: Life Expectancy versus Education. Source: World Development Indicators
CD-ROM, World Bank (2006)
In Figure 1.3 we propose an estimation of the relationship between life
expectancy and secondary education1. The circles are proportional to the
1We use the secondary gross enrollment ratio as a proxy of education (Source WDI
2006). The gross enrollment ratio is given by the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of
age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education
shown. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at
the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human
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country’s per capita income, the black ones indicate Sub-Saharan countries
and the gray ones indicate east Asian and Pacific countries (W.D.I, 2006).
Figure 1.3 shows a positive relationship between health and education and
low levels of education and health in poor countries.
In the literature the relationship between education and health has been
explained in three ways (Grossman, 2004). Firstly a higher level of educa-
tion leads to higher level of health: higher agent’s education implies a higher
willingness to invest in health care either because education makes people
better decision makers or because more educated people have better infor-
mations about health. Education can improve health through a better choice
of health inputs, that is education reduces smoking, improves eating habits
and increases exercise (Adams, 2002). In addition, home environment in gen-
eral and mother’s schooling in particular play an extremely important role
in the determination of child and adolescent health (Grossman, 1982; Shultz,
1999).
Secondly, the direction of causality runs from better health to more
schooling, i.e. good health is fundamental to acquire education. If chil-
dren’s health is not good his/her formal schooling is impossible. Loss in days
of schooling due to ill health reduces the effectiveness of investment in edu-
cation (Mushkin, 1962; Cutler et al., 2006). In addition, an increase in life
expectancy raises the investment in education since it reduces the rate of de-
preciation of investment in education and increases the return to it (Mushkin,
1962; De la Croix and Licandro, 1999).
Thirdly there are some unobserved variables such as physical and mental
abilities, genetic characteristics and parental background that affects both
health and schooling. For example, both education and health are largely
affected by parental input. The decisions made by parents concerning where
and how to raise a family depends on all family background characteristics
that affect both health and education investments. In addition intergenera-
tional transmissions of health have a strong effect on health.
Grossman (1972, 1982)’s papers are closely related to the first explana-
tion, i.e. he argues that years of schooling have a significant impact on adult
development, by offering more subject or skill oriented instruction using more specialized
teachers.
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population’s health even when income is held constant (Grossman, 1972). In
particular, he assumes the following specification for the stock of health in
the period t+ 1:
Ht+1 = It(Mt, THt;Et) +Ht (1− δ) , (1.1)
where It is the gross investment production function which depends on med-
ical care (Mt), the stock of human capital (Et) and the time input (THt) , δ
is the rate of depreciation. Shifts in human capital, measured by education,
i.e. Et , change the productivity in health investment. In particular, the
effect on investment in health of one-unit change in education, that is the
marginal product of Et, is given as follows:
∂It
∂Et
=Mt
∂ (IM)
∂Et
+ TH
∂ (ITH)
∂Et
, (1.2)
where IM = ∂It/∂Mt is the marginal product of medical care and ITH =
∂It/∂THt is the marginal product of time. Education raises the marginal
product of medical care and the time inputs and consequently it reduces the
quantity of these inputs required to produce a given amount of health invest-
ment (It). Hence, with no changes in input prices, an increase in education
lowers the marginal cost of health investment. For example, if education
increases the marginal products of medical care and time by 3 percent, it
would reduces the price of health investment by 3 percent (Grossman (1972)
p.243-246).
Closely related to Grossman’s paper, Adams (2002)’s work provides ev-
idence of a pronounced relationship between education and health among
older people in the U.S. in 1992. He uses the data from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) and restricts the sample to US individuals between
the ages of 51 and 61. In particular he estimates the following relationship:
Hi = βXi + γEi + εi, (1.3)
where Hi is the health level of individual i, Ei is agent’s educational attain-
ment measured as years of schooling completed and Xi is a set of variables
that affect education and health. These include basic individual characteris-
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tics, such as race and region of birth2. Both the OLS and the 2SLS results
show that higher levels of education lead higher level of health for older
people (at least at the 0.10 level of significance).
Lleras-Muney (2005) estimates the effect of compulsory education laws on
mortality. He uses the 1960, 1970 and 1980 censuses of the U.S. and analyzes
the effect of change in compulsory schooling laws happened between 1915 and
1939. He estimates the following aggregate model:
Dtcs = b+ λEtcs + βXtcs + δWtcs + γc + αs + εcs, (1.4)
where Dtcs is the proportion of individuals, belonging to cohort c and born
in state s, which died at time t, E is the education of that group (measured
by completed years of education), Xtcs are the average time invariant charac-
teristics such as gender, Wtcs is a set of characteristics of individual i’s state
of birth at age 14, γc is a set of cohort dummies and αs is a set of state of
birth dummies (Lleras-Muney, 2005). He estimates that an additional year
of schooling lowers the probability of dying in the next 10 years by 3.6 per-
centage points. In addition, he shows a direct effect of compulsory schooling
laws on mortality during adulthood: one more year of compulsory schooling
decreased mortality after age 35 by about 3%.
In accordance with this approach, many contributions focus on the pos-
itive relationship between parent’s human capital and child’s health status.
Increases in parent’s education lead to a higher demand for children’s school-
ing since more educated parents may value it more highly for their children
and can better help their children to learn (Shultz, 1993). According this
point, Shultz (1993) shows that higher level of parents education are corre-
lated with lower child mortality, even after holding per capita income con-
stant. In addition, the relationship from parent’s education to child health
is almost always more strong for the mother than for the father. In partic-
ular, a year of additional schooling for the mother is often associated, in a
low-income country, with 5-10 percent reduction in her child’s probability of
dying in the first five years of life (Shultz, 1993).
2The average female in the sample is 56.08 years of age and has 12.37 years of completed
schooling. The average male is 56.05 years old and has completed 12.65 years of schooling.
There are 4577 men in the sample and 4059 women (Adams, 2002).
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With respect to the second direction of causality which runs from good
health to better education, Rivera and Currais (1999) emphasize the effect
of health investment on labor productivity and human capital accumulation.
They develop an extension of the augmented Solow model which introduces
health investment. In particular, health enters in the production function as
follows:
Y (t) = K(t)αE(t)βH(t)η (A(t)L(t))µ , (1.5)
where Y is the aggregate output, K is the stock of physical capital, E is the
stock of education, H is the stock of health, A is the level of technology and
L is the labor. Some calculations lead to the following expression for the log
of the steady state level of income in units of effective labor:
ln y∗ =
α
µ
ln sk +
β
µ
ln se +
η
µ
ln sh −
1− µ
µ
ln (n+ g + δ) (1.6)
where n is the rate of population growth, g is the technological progress and
δ is the rate of depreciation. The evolution of income in the long run is given
as follows:
ln
(
y(t)
y(0)
)
=
(
1− e−λt
)
µ+ β
[α ln sk + β ln e
∗ + η ln sh − (1− µ− β) ln (n+ g + δ)]
(1.7)
−
(
1− e−λt
)
ln y(0),
where λ = (n+ g + δ)µ is the rate of convergence. Equation (1.7) is es-
timated by ordinary least square for the 24 OECD countries in the period
1960-1990. The total health expenditure on GDP is used as a proxy of in-
vestment in health. The results show that adding health investment to the
model reduces the size of coefficient for physical capital (from 0.37 to 0.33)
and education (from 0.25 to 0.20) whereas the fit of the regression improves
little (R2 increases from 0.87 to 0.88) (the coefficient associated to health is
0.22, for more details see (Rivera and Currais, 1999)).
De la Croix and Licandro (1999)’s paper shows that longevity affects hu-
man capital accumulation through agent’s decisions on the time to spend in
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education. In particular, they assume that agent’s human capital accumu-
lates according to the following expression:
h(t) = AH (t)T (t), (1.8)
where A is a productivity parameter, H (t) is the average human capital in
the economy and T (t) is the time spent at school. Given a linear utility
function the first order condition for T (t) yields the following expression for
the optimal time spent on education (for more details see Section 3.1):
T (t) =
1
θ + β
, (1.9)
where θ is the subjective discount rate and β is the rate at which the members
of a given generation die. Thus an increase in the death rate β implies a
reduction of the optimal time spent at school. Hence, when life expectancy
is short people choose to start working early in their life and not to stay at
school to long. In the other hand, when agents die later on average, they
prefer to devote more time to schooling in order to obtain higher future
wages.
Contrary to the approach showed up to now there are some studies that
argue the existence of a trade-off between health and human capital. For ex-
ample, the model of Van Zon and Muysken (2001) shows that an expansion
of health sector can promote economic growth through increased health of
population, while a contraction of the health sector could also free resources
necessary to promote growth by means of an increase in human capital ac-
cumulation activities. This approach provides an interesting contrast to the
analysis that suggests the existence of complementarity between health and
education, and it lead to analyze empirically the relationship between health
spending and education.
1.3 Life expectancy and economic growth
The literature which studies the economic consequences of mortality decline
in growth models, can be divided in two groups, on the basis of the main
assumptions and the results obtained: the first group assumes exogenous
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life expectancy and the second group develops growth model in which life
expectancy depends on the level of human capital.
Generally the literature which studies the effect of mortality reductions on
economic growth uses as basic framework the overlapping generation model
a` la Diamond (1965) in which agents have a probability of surviving to the
second period (or third period). In particular, the basic model is as follows:
U = u(ct) + pβu(ct+1), (1.10)
subject to the following budget constraints:{
ct = yt − st and
ct+1 = (1 + rt+1) st,
(1.11)
where ct is the consumption in the first period, yt is the income, st is the
saving, ct+1 is the consumption in the old age which is given, in an economy
without the state, by the saving augmented for the interest rate in the second
period (rt+1) , p is the probability of surviving to the second period and β is
the intertemporal discount rate.
1.3.1 Exogenous Life Expectancy
The literature which analyzes the effect of exogenous longevity on economic
growth yields homogeneous results: increasing longevity exerts, through dif-
ferent channels, opposing forces on economic growth. The net effect depends
on the initial mortality’s level of the country. In the poor ones, where life
expectancy is low, a reduction in the mortality rate has a positive effect on
economic growth, in the rich ones, where instead life expectancy is high, the
effect of a further increase in the average life on economic growth can be null
or negative.
In particular, these studies evidences two important effects produced by
increase in life expectancy. The first is that a higher life expectancy raises the
saving rate leading to physical capital accumulation. The papers of Zhang
et al. (2003) and Kageyama (2003) are two examples that generates this
effect. The second effect is that gains in life expectancy raise the investment
in education promoting human capital accumulation. One of the earlier
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contribution that shows this result is the paper of De la Croix and Licandro
(1999).
The theoretical contribution of Zhang et al. (2003) shows that a higher
longevity produces two opposite effect: on the one hand increases the propen-
sity to save and on the other hand lowers the accidental bequest. These re-
sults are obtained in an overlapping generations model in which agents live
for three periods and have an exogenous probability of surviving to old age.
In particular, they add to the general utility function in equation (1.10) the
quality of school for children, i.e. qt :
U = u(ct) + pβu(ct+1) + φu(qt), (1.12)
where p ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of surviving to the second period, ct and
ct+1 are defined in equation (1.11). A key assumption of this model is that
there is no annuity market, so that the saving of a deceased person becomes
an accidental bequest to his child, that is:
bt =
{
0 if p = 1
st−1 if p = 0.
(1.13)
Hence, this assumption introduces an inequality between agents who receive
a positive bequest and agents who receive no bequest. In addition, given
the accumulation rule for capital states which states that the savings are
transformed into productive capital for the next period, that is kt+1 = st, we
get:
bt = pst−1 = pkt. (1.14)
Equation (1.14) shows the first effect of an increase in life expectancy, that
is it reduces the accidental bequest and therefore the rate of physical capital
accumulation.
From the first order conditions, the optimal saving increases with the
probability of surviving to the second period, that is:
st =
βp
1 + βp
yt. (1.15)
Therefore an increase in life expectancy leads two opposite effects: firstly,
it reduces the accidental bequest (see equations (1.13) and (1.14)), secondly
14 Mortality Decline and Economic Growth
it raises the propensity to save and therefore increases the rate of physical
capital accumulation (see equation (1.15)). The net effect of increases in
life expectancy on economic growth depends on the life expectancy in the
country. If initial mortality is low, rising longevity may have a positive effect
on economic growth. Starting with low mortality, the effect of rising longevity
on growth can be negative (Zhang et al., 2003).
The positive effect of longevity on the saving emphasized in the Zhang et
al. (2003)’s paper is accepted by many theoretical and empirical contribu-
tions. Yaari (1965) is the first one which introduces the effect of uncertain
lifetime on the saving. He shows that when the survival function is intro-
duced in the intertemporal utility function the future is discounted more
heavily because of the uncertainty of survival. Levhary and Miriam (1977),
studying the effect of lifetime uncertainty on optimal consumption decisions,
show that when the utility function is CES (constant relative risk aversion)
and the interest rate is constant, an increase in the relative risk aversion im-
plies a lower consumption in the initial period. In other words, the individual
being more sensitive to the possibility of lower consumption in the future,
saves more in the initial period. In accordance to this view, the Modigliani’s
(1988) life cycle hypothesis shows that, even in absence of bequest, the fact
that income decreases with retirement, could generate an amount of wealth
quite large relative to income.
Strictly related to the paper of Zhang et al. (2003) are the papers of
Kageyama (2003) and Bloom and Canning (2000) which focus on the rela-
tionship between increases in life expectancy and the allocation of wealth
between consumption and saving.
Kageyama (2003) shows both theoretically and empirically that increases
in lifetime raise the aggregate saving. This is because higher longevity im-
plies that the younger cohort, in order to secure consumption for a longer
retirement, saves more than the older cohort consume (Kageyama, 2003). In
particular, he supposes that agents, born in the period t, maximize the in-
tertemporal utility function given by equation (1.10) subject to the following
constraints:
wt = ct + st, (1.16)
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ct+1 =
(1 + r)
p
st. (1.17)
Equation (1.17) embody the restrictive assumption that the total returns
from the savings of those who are deceased before reaching their old age is
equally redistributed, in the form of hump-shaped transfer, to the agents who
survive to the third period3.
Given a constant fertility rate, the optimal aggregate saving, in the period
t, is the difference between the saving of adults st and the consumption of
elderly, i.e. ct−1, that is:
St =
p
(1 + r)
(
1 + r
β
) 1
γ
ct − pct−1, (1.18)
where ct−1 is the consumption in the period t of agents born in t− 1. Given
equation (1.18) the length of lifetime does not necessarily affect the aggre-
gate saving. The central point is not the level of lifetime, but the size of the
increase in lifetime. This indicates that the rate at which lifetime is increas-
ing is positively correlated with aggregate saving. This result is tested and
supported by the empirical analysis using the household data in the period
1960-1989.
De la Croix and Licandro (1999) focus on the effect of increases in life
expectancy on human capital accumulation. The basic idea is that longevity,
influencing agent’s investment in education, affects human capital accumula-
tion. They analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents decide
the time to devote to education before starting to work. In particular, the
expected utility of agents born in t and living in z is:
∞∫
t
u(c (z, t))e−(β+θ)(z−t)dz,
where θ is the subjective discount rate, β is the death rate and u(c (z, t)) is
the instantaneous utility function of consumption. In particular, u(c (z, t))
3In particular, the assumption is that ct+1 is given as follows:
ct+1 = st (1 + r) + τt,
where:
τt =
(1− p) st (1 + r)
p
.
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is assumed linear. The agent’s budget constraint is:
∞∫
t
c (z, t)R (z, t) dz =
∞∫
t+T (t)
h(t)w(z)R (z, t) dz,
where T (t) is the time devoted to schooling, R(z, t) is the discount factor and
h(t) is the individual’s human capital defined in equation (1.8). Since total
output is assumed a linear function of the aggregate stock of human capital,
the wage per unit of human capital is equal to one, that is w(z) = 1 for each
z.
The effect of increases in life expectancy on the growth rate results from
combining three factors. First, given the optimal time spent in education,
i.e. T (t), as follows:
T (t) =
1
θ + β
a reduction in the death rate, that is β, leads to an increase in the time
devoted to education. Second, increases in life expectancy implies reductions
in the depreciation rate of aggregate human capital. Indeed, the aggregate
stock of human capital given by the following expression:
H (t) = H (0) e−βt +
t−T∫
−T
βe−β(t−z) [ATH (z)] dz
decreases at a rate β as time passes and people die.
Third, the economy consists of more of old agents who did their schooling
a long time ago.
The two first effects have a positive influence on the growth rate but the
third effect has a negative influence. Numerical computations show that,
when life expectancy is below a certain threshold, a higher longevity affects
positively economic growth. In rich countries where life expectancy is high
the net effect of a higher life expectancy could be negative. This is because
the positive effect of a longer life on economic growth could be offset by an
increase in the average age of the workers.
The literature discussed in this section obtains important insights on the
relationship between life expectancy and economic growth. Yet, the mecha-
nism through which mortality declines is not specified, so any link between
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health spending and saving or investment in education and saving is not an-
alyzed. Life expectancy, as empirical evidence shows (see Figures 1.2 and
1.3), is not exogenous, but it depends on individual’s income, human capital
and, in general, on the economic development of the country. Thus in poor
countries, without exogenous shock or external interventions, life expectancy
can not increase. Empirical analysis, indeed, shows that several poor coun-
tries are in a low equilibrium characterized by a low per capita income, a low
life expectancy, low health investment and education spending (Cutler et al.,
2006). The literature which assumes endogenous longevity investigates some
of these central issues.
1.3.2 Endogenous Life Expectancy
Many theoretical and empirical contributions which study the effect of gains
in health on economic growth suppose that human capital is the main vari-
able affecting life expectancy. In particular, this literature develops growth
models that can explain the demographic transition from high to low rates of
mortality and fertility. This approach, described by Galor and Weil (1999),
characterizes the process of economic development passing through three
distinct regimes (Galor and Weil, 1999). The first is called the Malthu-
sian Regime. Here the relationship between income per capita and popula-
tion growth is positive: small increases in income lead to population growth
(Lagerlof, 2003). In the second regime, called the post-Malthusian regime,
both per capita income and population present a positive growth rate and
their relationship remains positive as in the Malthusian regime. The final
stage of development is the Modern Growth Regime. In this latter, both in-
come per capita and the level of technology present a positive growth rate
whereas population growth declines. Galor and Weil (1999) focus on the
technology, the evolution of population and the output growth as the key el-
ements which can explain the transition process through to this three stages.
They argue that the technological progress raises the rate of return to hu-
man capital inducing parents to invest in children education. In particular,
the technological progress has two effects on population growth. On the one
hand, improved technology increases households’ budget constraints, allow-
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ing them to spend more resources on raising children. On the other hand,
it induces a reallocation of these increased resources toward child quality
(Galor and Weil, 1999). In the Post-Malthusian Regime, the former effect
dominates, and so population grows. However, since the return to child
quality continues to rise, the shift away from child quantity becomes more
significant causing a reduction in the population growth rate and an increase
in the output growth rate (Galor and Weil, 1999).
According to this approach, (Lagerlof, 2003)’s paper models demographic
and economic long-run development in a setting where mortality depends
on agent’s human capital and subjects to epidemic shocks. He considers
an overlapping generations economy where agents potentially live for two
periods. In particular, the probability of surviving to the second period is
specified as follows:
Tt =
Ht/Pt
ωt +Ht/Pt
, (1.19)
where Pt denotes the adult population size in the period t, Ht is the human
capital inherited from parents and ωt the epidemic shocks. Thus, the survival
rate Tt lies between 0 and 1, it decreases with epidemic shocks and population
density, and it increases with human capital. Advances in medical skills
reduce the impact on mortality of epidemics. The production function of
human capital takes the following form:
Ht+1 = A (Pt) [L+Ht] (pυ + ht) , (1.20)
where A (Pt) is a productivity parameter which denotes the effectiveness with
which one generation transmits human capital to the next, L is the agent’s
innate human capital, υ is the time spent nursing each child and pυ measures
the direct inheritance of human capital from one generation to the next, and
ht is the time spent educating the child.
Equation (1.19) and (1.20) show the two opposite effects of population
density: on the one hand it increases the impact on mortality of epidemic
shocks (see equation (1.19)), on the other hand it have a positive effect on
productivity in the human capital sector (see equation (1.20)).
Agent maximizes the following utility function:
U = ln (Ct) + α ln (BtTt) + αδ ln (L+Ht+1) , (1.21)
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whereBtTt is the number of children who survive to the second period and L+
Ht+1 captures the parent’s utility get from the quality of children. Optimal
conditions imply that the number of children decreases with the time spent
on children (υ + ht), that is:
Bt =
(
α
1 + α
)
1
(υ + ht)
.
The optimal time spent in education increases with the rate of return to
human capital investment A (Pt) [L+Ht] ,that is:
ht ≥
1
1− δ
[
υ (δ − ρ)−
L
A (Pt) [L+Ht]
]
, (1.22)
where (δ − ρ) > 0 since ρ < δ < 1. The inequality in equation (1.22) follows
from the condition that ht ≥ 0. Thus if υ (δ − ρ) < L/A (Pt) [L+Ht] then
ht = 0 and the inequality is strict. Otherwise equation (1.22) holds with
equality.
Lagerlof (2003) distinguish two cases: a high-ω world and low-ω world.
In the first case the economy shows three steady state. The first steady state
is a Malthusian equilibrium where the time spent in education is zero. The
stability originates from the increased mortality effect of a larger population.
The second steady state is unstable and it is a threshold that separates
the two growth regions. Above the threshold the economy converges to a
sustained growth in human capital and population, below it converges to
the Malthusian equilibrium. In the second case, that is low-ω world, there
is no Malthusian equilibrium and the economy exhibits sustained growth
regardless of where it starts off.
The transition from the Malthusian trap to the sustained growth is gen-
erated from a series of mild epidemic shocks. When the economy experiences
a phase of relatively mild epidemic shocks, mortality rates fall leading to
a positive population growth rate. However, birth rates remain unchanged
and parents do not invest in children’s education. Thus, the economy is in
the post Malthusian regime. When the education time becomes positive the
economy transits into the modern growth regime. In this regime, the econ-
omy experience a quality-quantity substitution in children, i.e. birth rates
fall since education time make children more expensive. Once the growth rate
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of human capital is high the impact of further epidemics becomes negligible
and the economy remains in the modern growth regime (Lagerlof, 2003).
Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) show a framework where changes in human
capital characterize the demographic transition. Agents live potentially three
periods and have an endogenous probability of surviving to the second period.
In the first period agent is raised by her parent, in the second period she/he
works, invests in education and bears their children and in the third period
she/he works and bears their children. Thus, since agents work in both the
second and third period they do not save to finance the consumption in the
old age. This assumption rules out the intergenerational transmission of
wealth through the saving of parents which do not survive to the old age.
People are non altruistic and children are treated as consumption goods,
i.e. parents derive utility from the production of offspring. In particular,
the utility from the number of children n is add to the expected utility
function in equation (1.10). Longevity pit+1, is increasing in agent’s human
capital. This latter depends on agent’s innate potential h, and the human
capital inherited from her/his parents ht+1. In particular, human capital
accumulates according to:
ht+2 = B (ht+1 + h) (1− lt+1 − qnt+1) , (1.23)
where lt+1 is the time spent on work, q is the time spent to raise each child
and nt+1 is the number of children. Hence (1− lt+1 − qnt+1) is the total time
spent in education. Optimal conditions imply that the number of children
and the supply of labor decreases with life expectancy, that is:
nt+1 =
γ
q (1 + γ + pit+1θ)
, (1.24)
lt+1 =
1
1 + γ + pit+1θ
, (1.25)
where θ is the discount factor and γ is the the utility weight on offspring,
i.e. γu(nt+1). Combining equation (1.24) and (1.25) it follows that total time
spent in education increases with life expectancy:
1− lt+1 − qnt+1 =
pit+1θ
1 + γ + pit+1θ
, (1.26)
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Substituting equation (1.26) in equation (1.23) we obtain that increases in
pit+1 has a positive effect on human capital accumulation by increasing the
amount of time devoted to education, that is:
ht+2 =
B (ht+1 + h)pit+1 (ht+1) θ
1 + γ + pit+1 (ht+1) θ
. (1.27)
This framework produces multiple development regimes such that the growth
of economy depends on initial conditions (see Figure 1.4 ).
ht+2
ht+1h
∗
L h
c
Figure 1.4: Multiple development regimes
There is a threshold level of human capital hc, below which the economy
is on a low development path and above which the economy is on high devel-
opment path. An economy with an initial human capital below hc converge
to a low steady state h∗L where life expectancy is low, education is low and
fertility is high. An economy with an initial human capital above hc is on a
high development path, where life expectancy is high, education is high and
fertility is low (see Figure 1.4). Thus, the initial stock of human capital de-
termines the initial probability of survival and the initial allocation between
education, working and child rearing. The demographic transition from the
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low to high equilibrium is determined by exogenous shifts in the stock of
human capital that can push the existing level of human capital above the
threshold (Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002).
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Figure 1.5: Life Expectancy versus Fertility. Source: World Development Indicators
CD-ROM, World Bank (2006)
Looking at Figure 1.5 we may have an insight of the relationship between
life expectancy and fertility (2002). The circles are proportional to the coun-
try’s per capita income, the black ones indicate Sub-Saharan countries and
the gray ones indicate east Asian and Pacific countries. Figure 1.5 supports
the inverse relationship between life expectancy and fertility. In addition, in
poor countries (black circles) low per capita incomes are associated to high
fertility rate.
The recent contribution by Cervellati and Sunde (2005) analyzes the in-
teractions between life expectancy and agent’s decisions to acquire human
capital, that is to be skilled or unskilled workers. The demographic tran-
sition is based on a positive relationship between life expectancy, human
capital formation, and endogenous technological progress. Human capital is
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a central factor of production, affects positively longevity and the productiv-
ity of future generations. Individuals themselves, rather than their parents,
decide about their education. Thus, the model exclude parent’s investment
in education, public provision of education and any link between generations,
through savings and bequest.
Agents are endowed with a life expectancy Tt and can decide to invest
part of their lifetime in education and supply skilled labor or supply, for all
their lifetime Tt, unskilled labor which requires no education. In the first
case they spent a fixed cost in terms of time (e), earning a wage
(
wH
)
for
the time Tt− e. In particular, the total lifetime income for skilled individuals
is:
V H = a(Tt − e)w
H , (1.28)
where a is agent’s ability. Alternatively agents can supply unskilled labor
earning the following income for the whole lifetime:
V L = Ttw
L. (1.29)
If V H = V L then agent is indifferent whether or not to acquire human capital.
The equality V H = V L yields the following ability threshold:
a˜t =
Tt
(Tt − e)
wL
wH
. (1.30)
Hence, agents with a > a˜ find it profitable to incur the cost and acquire
human capital, while those with a < a˜ prefer to remain unskilled.
From the first order conditions, the equilibrium fraction of the population
acquiring human capital λt, is given as follows:
λt = Λ
−1 (Tt, At) , (1.31)
which comes from the following relationship between life expectancy and λt :
Tt = Λ (λt, At) =
e
1− Ω (At) g (λt)
, (1.32)
where Ω (At) = 1/ (2
1−αAt) , At = A
H
t /A
L
t , and g(λt) = [(1−(1−λt)
2)1−α/(1−
λt)
2−α].
From equation (1.31) λt is increasing in life expectancy Tt and in the
relative productivity of the human-capital intensive sector, that is At. Thus
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a higher life expectancy implies more people that invest a part of their lifetime
to acquire education.
The relationship between longevity and human capital acquisition in
equation (1.32) is nonlinear and S-shaped, it is more pronounced for in-
termediate values of T and λ. When life expectancy is low people prefer to
remain unskilled since the fixed time cost (e) which the acquisition of educa-
tion implies. On the other hand when λt is high, are necessary large increases
in life expectancy to lead individuals to acquire human capital. The decreas-
ing returns in both sector, indeed, imply that when there are few unskilled
workers their marginal productivity is relatively large so that they do not
find profitable to invest in human capital even if life expectancy is very high.
Cervellati and Sunde (2005) assume that life expectancy of generation t
increases in the fraction of the population of the previous generation that
acquired human capital (λt−1) , that is:
Tt = Υ(λt−1) = T + ρλt−1, (1.33)
where ρ > 0 reflects the extent of the externality and T > e is the minimum
life expectancy when λt−1 = 0.
This framework captures two crucial features of the human capital for-
mation process. First, as in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), longer life ex-
pectancy motivates agents to accumulate human capital. Second higher in-
nate ability, which is less important for providing manual labor, facilitates
the acquisition of human capital.
Figure (1.6) illustrates the system given by equations (1.31) and (1.33)
for a given level of technology A > 0 and with equation (1.31) defined for
T ∈ [e,∞) .
The system given by equations (1.31) and (1.33) displays at least one
stable steady state and at most three steady state equilibria (Cervellati and
Sunde, 2005). Figure (1.6) illustrates the system in the case of three equilib-
ria. The low equilibrium is locally stable and it is characterized by low life
expectancy and a small share of the population acquiring human capital, the
high equilibrium is locally stable and is characterized by a relatively large
fraction of skilled individuals and high life expectancy. The third equilibrium
is unstable and shows a positive supply of skilled and unskilled labor. The
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Figure 1.6: Phase Diagram
transition from the low steady state to the high equilibrium occurs genera-
tions by generations and requires an exogenous technological change, since
during the phase of stagnancy people not find optimal to invest in educa-
tion. In particular, an economy with sufficiently low A and sufficiently large
e passes through the following phases of development: i) a period, that could
be very long, of low-type equilibria; ii) a rapid transition toward a sequence of
high-type equilibria; (iii) a phase of sustained growth (Cervellati and Sunde,
2005) .
Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) focuses on the effect of reductions in children’s
mortality on parent’s choice about the quantity and quality of children. With
respect to the work of Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) this model assumes
altruistic agents which derive utility from consumption and the human capital
of their surviving children, that is:
Ut =
nt∑
Nt=0
{γ ln (ct) + (1− γ)Et [Ntwt+1ht+1]} f (Nt;nt, qt) ,
where Ntwt+1ht+1 is the future income of surviving children. In particular
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Nt is the number of survivors, wt+1 is the future wage of surviving children
per unit of human capital and ht+1 is children’s human capital. The function
f (Nt;nt, qt) is the probability that Nt out of nt children will survive and qt
is the survival probability of each child.
Parents choose the number of children and the optimal amount of edu-
cation to give each child. Agent’s prudence on the uncertainty about child
survival causes a precautionary demand for children. An exogenous decline
in the mortality rate (qt) implies a reduction in the uncertainty which in turn
causes a lower precautionary demand of children and a rise in educational
investment.
When the survival probability of each child is endogenous, that it is a
concave function of the per capita income, qt = q (yt) , the income growth
rate shows multiple development path. At low levels of income per capita,
population increases with income causing a reduction of income per capita.
Thus the economy is in a stable Malthusian steady state where fertility is
high and human capital investment is low. At high levels of income per
capita population growth falls as income per capita increases. This leads
to a unstable growth steady state with low fertility and high human capital
investment, above which sustained growth is achieved.
Soares (2005) develops a model where exogenous increases in life ex-
pectancy together with a stable relationship between life expectancy, in-
vestment in education and fertility, generate the demographic transition. In
particular, the model incorporates the effect of both reductions in child and
adult mortality on human capital accumulation.
This framework differs from the others for two main assumptions. First,
the utility that parents derive from each child is affected by child mortality
and adult longevity. This assumption implies that parents care about the
number of children surviving into adulthood and the lifetime that each child
will enjoy as an adult. In particular, the expected utility takes the following
form:
Ut = T
cσ
σ
dt+ ρ (n, T, β)
hc
α
α
, (1.34)
where the subjective discount rate and the interest rate are equal zero, hc
is the human capital of each children and ρ (n, T, β) is the discount factor
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which is a function of the number of children n, child mortality β and adult
longevity T .
Second, the model distinguishes between investment of parents in their
own human capital e and in that of their children b. In particular, adult
human capital Hp depends on the time invested in education e and on the
basic human capital hp that individuals have when enter in adulthood:
Hp = Aehp +Ho, (1.35)
where Ho is the level of adult’s human capital when they do not invest in
education. The basic idea is that adults, deciding the time to devote to
education, can improve their basic level of human capital hp. Adult human
capital and the time invested in children b, determines the basic human
capital of each child:
hc = DbHp + ho, (1.36)
where ho is the children’s human capital in the absence of investment in
education.
The first order conditions show that increases in longevity affect the econ-
omy through two channels. First, the optimal time devoted to adult educa-
tion increases with adult longevity since gains in adult lifetime increase the
period over which returns from investments in education can be enjoyed, that
is:
e =
T
2
. (1.37)
This result leads to a higher productivity in the labor market and in raising
children (see equations 1.35 and 1.36). Indeed, a higher investment in adult
education raises the basic human capital of each child.
Second, since the optimal number of children n decreases with adult
longevity, that is dn/dT < 0, the shadow price of hc is reduced. Thus, a
lower fertility and a higher household productivity makes relatively cheaper
for parents to give more human capital to each child, that is dhc/dT > 0.
Given equations (1.35) and (1.36), and assuming Ho = 0 and ho = 0,
the growth rate of basic human capital is hc/hp = DAbe > 1. Hence from
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equation (1.37) longevity gains increase the steady state rate of growth of
the economy.
When hp = ho, the economy is in a Malthusian equilibrium where there
is no investment in education, that is the optimal individual choice implies
b = e = 0. In this situation, changes in longevity are positively related to
changes in both consumption and fertility, i.e. dn/dT > 0 and dc/dT > 0.
The demographic transition from the Malthusian equilibrium to the sus-
tained growth is characterized as a consequence of successive reductions in
mortality. Increases in adult life expectancy lead to higher returns from
investment in adult education because of the longer period over which edu-
cation is productive. When these gains are large enough, parents decide to
start investing in their own education (e > 0). In the other hand, gains in
adult longevity increase the amount of resources available implying an in-
come effect that tends to raise fertility. However, the assumptions in relation
to ∂ρ/∂n (that is ∂ρ/∂n = 0 for n large enough) imply that increases in
fertility tend to reduce its marginal utility to a point where parents start
to reduce the number of children and to invest in their children (b > 0).
After both these thresholds are reached the economy moves to the sustained
growth (Soares, 2005).
The literature discussed so far identifies in the human capital the principal
determinant of reductions in mortality. However, the explicit effect of health
spending on life expectancy and, through this channel, the effect of health
investment on economic growth is not analyzed. The recent health economics
literature, founding on the earlier theoretical contributions on the demand
of health, focus on the direct effect of health investment on life expectancy
and the effect of both quantity and quality of life on economic growth.
1.4 Mortality and Health Spending
The recent health literature focuses on the explicit role of health spending on
life expectancy, on the concept of the value of life and the willingness to pay
criterion to reduce mortality risk. This studies emphasizes the central im-
portance of both quality and quantity of life for the overall economic welfare.
Welfare depends not only on income but also on the numbers of years over
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which this income is enjoyed (Becker et al., 2005). The income per capita,
indeed, measures material gains that are only one of many aspects of life
that enhance economic welfare. In accordance with this point, the paper of
Becker et al. (2005) develops a growth model in which the monetary value
of longevity is add to the observed gains in income per capita.
They estimate that when longevity changes are included in the income’s
growth rate, countries became significantly more equal between 1960 and
2000 (Becker et al., 2005). there is an average yearly growth of 4.1 percent,
of which 1.7 percentage points are due to health. For the richest 50 percent
of countries the average yearly growth is 2.6 percent and only 0.4 percentage
points are due to health (Becker et al., 2005).
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Figure 1.7: Life Expectancy versus Health Spending. Source: World Development
Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank (2006)
They impute the strong decline in life expectancy inequality between 1960
and 1990 to the fact that countries starting with low longevity tended to gain
more in life expectancy than countries starting with high longevity. Countries
with higher initial mortality would have larger mortality reductions because
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they have much higher returns on investment in health than do countries
with lower mortality (Becker et al., 2005).
Figure 1.7 shows the relationship between life expectancy at birth and
the per capita health expenditure in 2002. In many poor countries low level
of health spending are associated to low level of life expectancy.
We start the section with the demand of health developed in the Gross-
man (1972)’s seminal paper and then we present the recent results on the
value of life and the willingness to pay criterion to reduce the mortality risk.
1.4.1 Demand for health
The seminal work of Grossman (1972) was the first one which develops a
model for the demand of “health”. Health, as other commodities, directly
enters in the utility function and people demand health since it increases the
quality of life and time available for market and nonmarket activities (Gross-
man, 1972). Thus, the intertemporal utility function takes the following
form:
U = U (φ0H0, ....φnHn, Z0.....Zn) , (1.38)
where H0 is the inherited stock of health, Hn is the stock of health in the
period n, φn is the service flow per unit of stock, hn = φnHn is the total
consumption of health services and Zn may be viewed as an aggregate of
other commodities besides health (Grossman, 1972).
Health is treated as a durable commodity and agents inherit an initial
stock of health that depreciates over time and can be augmented by invest-
ment. Death occurs when the stock of health falls below a minimum level
i.e. Hm. In particular, the stock of health in the period t+ 1 is:
Ht+1 = It +Ht (1− δt) , (1.39)
where It is the investment in health care and δt is the rate of depreciation
during the period t. Health investment It depends on medical care, the
stock of human capital and the time input. In particular, the household’s
production function of gross investments in health (Becker, 1965) is defined
as follows:
It = It(Mt, THt;Et), (1.40)
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where Mt are the medical care, THt is the time input and Et is the stock of
human capital.
The optimal investment in health is determined when the value of the
marginal cost of gross investment in health is equal to the value of marginal
benefits, that is:
pit−1 (r − p˜it−1 + δt) = Gt
[
Wt +
Uht
λ
(1 + r)t
]
, (1.41)
where the left side is the supply price of health capital and contains the
terms pit−1 =Wt−1/(∂I/∂TH) which is the marginal cost of gross investment
in health in period t − 1, p˜it−1 is the percentage rate of change in marginal
cost between period t − 1 and period t, r is the interest rate and δt is the
depreciation rate. The right side is the value of the marginal product of the
optimal stock of health capital. In particular, Gt is the marginal product of
the stock of health in the production of healthy days, that is the increase
in the number of healthy days caused by a one-unit increase in the stock of
health. Uht is the marginal utility of healthy days, λ is the marginal utility of
wealth. The wage rate Wt and the term Uht/λ convert the marginal product
Gt into value terms. In particular, the discounted wage rate measures the
monetary value of a one-unit increase in the total amount of time available for
market and nonmarket activities. The term Uht/λ measures the discounted
monetary equivalent of the increase in utility due to a one-unit increase in
healthy time. Thus the sum of these two terms measures the discounted
marginal value to consumers of the output produced by healthy time.
When health is assumed only a form of investment, i.e. it does enter in
the utility function, the optimal health investment is given by the equilibrium
between the demand and supply curve of health, that is:
r − p˜it−1 + δt =
GtWt
pit−1
. (1.42)
The demand curve of health (right side of equation 1.42) is negatively inclined
and shows the relationship between the stock of health and the marginal
return of health. The supply curve (left side of equation 1.42), given by the
cost of health capital, is infinitely elastic since it is independent on health.
The demand curve is negatively related with health’s shadow price which
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depends on the price of medical care, the agent’s age, education, wealth
and wage rates. The optimal amount of health capital is obtained when the
cost of health investment is equal to the future benefit of the health capital
(Grossman, 1972).
When the rate of depreciation increases with age the supply curve of
health capital shifts upward. This determines a reduction of the quantity
of health capital demanded over the life cycle. In particular, the greater is
the elasticity of the health curve demand, the greater is the decrease in the
optimal stock with age. An increase in agent’s wage rate, implying a higher
value of healthy time, shifts upward the demand curve. This lead to a higher
health capital demanded.
A central result is the effect of variations in the level of human capital on
the demand of health. The basic assumption is that more educated people
are more efficient producers of money earnings. Consequently, shifts in hu-
man capital, measured by education, change the agent’s productivity. The
effect on gross health investment of one-unit change in education, i.e. ∂I/∂E,
is a weighted average of the percentage change in the marginal products of
medical care M and time inputs TH (see equation 1.40). Because educa-
tion raises the marginal efficiency of the inputs M and TH then it reduces
the quantity of these inputs required to produce a given amount of gross
investment. Hence, with no changes in input prices, an increase in the hu-
man capital lowers the marginal cost. In addition, if the wage rate and the
marginal product of a given stock of health are held constant, an increase in
the education would raise the marginal efficiency of health capital and shifts
the demand curve to the right. This implies that the more educated people
would demand a larger optimal stock of health (Grossman, 1972).
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990)’s paper is strictly related to the Grossman’s
seminal work on the demand for health. As the Grossman’s model, they
specify a demand function for longevity, or “quantity of life”to which corre-
sponds demand functions for indicators of “quality of life”and a value of life
extension function (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990).
They start with Grossman’s basic formulation, in continuous time, where
health increases the lifetime utility and earnings capacity (see equation 1.38,
1.39 and 1.40). Health capital has two effects: firstly it augments the amount
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of healthy time available in any instant of life, secondly it delays the approach
of death since the latter is assumed to occur when health deteriorates to its
minimum “subsistence”level. Contrary to Grossman’s model where health
investment is produced through constant returns to scale they assume that
health production, that is I (t) = I(M,TH;E) is subject to decreasing re-
turns to scale. In particular, the cost of health investment is:
C(I) = piI (t)α α > 1, (1.43)
where pi = pi(M,TH;E) denotes the one-unit cost of producing I(t) and it
supposed constant over time. Optimal health investment is determined when
the marginal cost of health investment intersect the shadow price of health
capital, that is:
αpiI (t)α−1 =
λH (t)
λA (t)
, (1.44)
where the left hand side represents the marginal cost of producing health and
the right hand side the shadow price which is given by the ratio between the
marginal utility of health λH and the marginal utility of wealth λA. Given the
optimal health investment in equation (1.44), they emphasize the central role
of initial wealth A(0) rather than current income in determining longevity.
Their analysis shows that an increase in A(0) leads to an increase in lifetime
wealth and raises the entire paths of health stocks and consumption over
the life cycle. The main result is that health behaves as a superior good in
response to a higher initial wealth level, i.e. health would rise with initial
wealth in order to obtain a higher longevity.
In addition, Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) stress the effect of the time pref-
erence rate for consumption on the health demand. Even in the case in
which current health makes no contribution to current utility, a higher rate
of time preference reduces the demand for longevity and thus optimal health
investment (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). The basic idea is that there exists
an implicit trade-off between “quality of life”, obtained through an initial
consumption level, and longevity. Thus a higher rate of time preferences
increases current consumption, i.e. the demand for the quality of life and
reduces the propensity to save, i.e. the demand for longevity (Ehrlich and
Chuma, 1990).
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The current variables, such as education, the rate of health deprecia-
tion, the wage and the price of medical cares affect the demand of longevity
through the wealth effects that they generate. Agent’s level of education,
for example, affects positively the demand of health, in a given wage level,
both since more educated people invest better in health and since education
generates a wealth effect. Finally, the uncertainty of the incidence of illness
implies that agents purchase extra medical care and increase their saving as
a precaution against future periods of illness.
1.4.2 Value of life and willingness to pay to reduce
mortality risk
Ehrlich and Yin (2005) develop a model to derive a theoretical measure of the
“value of life saving”. The basic idea is to quantify the importance of individ-
ual efforts at health and life protection in explaining the trend and persistent
disparities in age specific life expectancies across population groups (Ehrlich
and Yin, 2005). A central aspect of their approach is the correspondence
between efforts to reduce mortality risk, that is “life protection”measures s,
and the definition of “value of life saving”.
There are two states of the world: “life” with probability 1− p (s) , and
“death” with probability p(s). Agents enjoy a higher utility in the state life,
that is:
U =
{
U(W − s) with probability 1− p (s)
V (W − s) with probability p (s) ,
where W is the wealth constraint and U(W − s) > V (W − s).
The “willingness to pay”for a marginal reduction in the probability of
mortality or the “value of life saving”is given by the equality between the
marginal cost of life protection and its marginal benefit, that is:
−1/p′(s) =
U (W − s)− V (W − s)
(1− p(s))U ′(W − s) + p(s)V ′(W − s)
, (1.45)
where the numerator defines the difference in utility between being alive or
dead and the denominator is the marginal expected utility of wealth.
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Ehrlich and Yin (2005) estimate for the US population in 1996 that the
value of life saving exhibits an inverted U shape; it starts a $1.236 at age 18
(in 1996 dollars), peaks at $1.440 million at age 38 and falls monotonically
at the early 60s. This inverted U shape reflects the influence of the life-cycle
profiles of human wealth. The human wealth represents the capitalized sums
of remaining net earning flows, that is the difference between employment
earning and expenditure on self protection, discounted for both the cost of
future funds and mortality risk. Based on markets wage, human wealth
peaks at age 29, then decreases continuously and becomes negative after age
78 which is the last age with projected positive earnings. This nonlinear path
of the human wealth reflects both increasing expenses for life protection and
increasing risks of mortality with age.
A higher degree of relative risk aversion increases the value of life saving
and the demand for life protection. A higher bequest preferences lowers the
demand for life protection, that is if agents give a high value to the bequest for
their descendants then the marginal value of longevity decreases. An increase
in the wage implies higher earnings which raise the human wealth and thus
the demand for life protection, since the only way to secure future earnings
is through survival. Finally, education raises the efficiency of life protection,
the opportunity cost of time devoted to it and, the incentive to protect the
wealth through survival. This latter effect is based on the assumption that
more educated people posses relatively higher wealth.
According to the concept of “value of life saving”, the Murphy and Topel
(2006)’s paper emphasizes that the valuation of improvements in health is
important since they are a form of economic progress. Health improvements
presents a value which increases with the population, the lifetime income,
the existing level of health and the closer is the age of population to the age
of disease. They distinguish two types of health improvements: those that
increase life expectancy and those which raise the quality of life. A higher life
expectancy allows agents to enjoy utility from goods and leisure for a longer
period of life, improvements in the quality of life raise utility from a given
amount of goods and leisure. Improvements in agent’s health level tends to
be complementary, that is an increase in life expectancy tend to increase the
willingness to pay for further health improvements by increasing the value of
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remaining life.
They distinguishes two types of technologies. The first H(t) raises the
quality of life without affecting mortality. For example technologies that
improve mental health may increase instantaneous utility without affecting
mortality. H(t) enters in the utility function and affect the quality of life by
increasing the utility from consumption c(t) and nonmarket time l(t). The
second G(t) affects mortality without affecting the quality of life. Thus G(t)
affects the survival function which is specified as follows:
S˜ (t, a) = e−
R t
a
λ(τ,G(τ))dτ ,
where S˜ (t, a) is the probability of surviving from age a to t and λ (τ,G (τ))
is the instantaneous mortality rate at the period τ . They assume a perfect
annuity market, that is the expected discounted value of future consumption
equals expected wealth.
From the first order conditions, the value of life at age a is:
Vλ (a) =
∫
∞
a
v (t) e−r(t−a)S˜ (t, a) dt, (1.46)
where v (t) is the value of a life year, that is:
v (t) =
u (c(t), l(t))
u′ (c(t), l(t))
+ y(t)− c(t), (1.47)
which is given by the value of utility and net savings at age t. Savings
affect v(t) because they finance consumption in other periods. The term H
does not appear explicitly in equation(1.46) since the model assumes that it
raises the total utility and the marginal utility of consumption by the same
proportional amount. However, H affects the rate of change in the value of
a life year v˙(t) = f(H˙). That is, life years become less valuable as health
deteriorates and persons in declining health are more impatient.
The willingness to pay for any factor α which affects health is given as
follows:
Vα (a) =
∫
∞
a
v (t)Sα (t, a) +
∫
∞
a
H ′α (t)
H (t)
u (c (t) , l (t))
uc
S (t, a) dt, (1.48)
where the first term is the value of additional lifetime utility from changes in
mortality and the second term is the value of changes in H. From equation
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(1.48) and (1.47) we can see that the willingness to pay for health includes
the value of non-market time and rises with wealth, that is richer societies
invest proportionally more in health.
Strictly related to the willingness to pay criterion and the value of life
saving is the recent contribution of Jones and Hall (2006). The principal
aim of the paper is to explain, through agent’s preferences, the causes of the
rise in health spending in the United States in the period 1950-2000. They
present a framework in which agents have to allocate their total resources
between consumption c and health investment h. Agents do not save so there
is not any reference to the intergenerational transmission of wealth.
As in the Murphy and Topel (2006)’s model, utility depends on the length
of life and the quality of life. Spending on health therefore affects utility in
two ways: i) by increasing the quantity of life through a mortality reduction
and ii) by increasing the quality of life. However, in this model the quality of
life is given by the consumption whereas in the model of Murphy and Topel
there is some medical services which affects only the quality of life.
Optimal conditions imply that the ratio of health spending to consump-
tion is equal to the ratio of the elasticities of health production function and
the flow utility function, that is:
h
c
=
ηh
ηc
, (1.49)
where ηh = f
′(h)h/f(h), f(h) is the health production function which gov-
erns the individual’s state of health and ηc = u
′(c)c/u(c).
Adding a constant to the standard utility function they can explain the
rising path of health share. In particular, this behavior depends on increasing
returns of health spending and the decreasing marginal utility of consump-
tion. As income rises people prefer to devote more resources to health care,
which allows to live additional years of life rather than to the consumption.
The optimal health spending is determined by the equality between the
marginal benefit of saving a life and its marginal cost, that is:
βva+1,t+1
uc
+
uf(h)f(ha,t)
2
uc
=
f(ha,t)
2
f ′(ha,t)
, (1.50)
where the left hand side is the marginal benefit of saving a life which is given
by the sum of the social value of life βva+1,t+1/uc and the additional utility
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which agents enjoy as a result of the increase in health status
[
uf(h)f(ha,t)
2
]
/uc.
In particular, va+1,t+1 = ∂Vt/∂Na,t denotes the change in social welfare Vt as-
sociated with having an additional person of age a alive (Na,t is the number
of people of age a alive at time t). The right hand side is the marginal cost
of saving a life, that is the ratio between the increase in resources devoted to
health care and the reduction in mortality rate. In particular, 1/f ′(h) is the
cost of increasing the survival rate f(h).
Many other contributions stress the luxury good behavior of health spend-
ing. For example, Chakraboty and Das (2005) investigates the relationship
between health and wealth inequality. They analyze a two-period overlapping
generations model with altruistic parents who leave a part of their earnings
to their children as bequest at the end of the second period (bt+1). The prob-
ability of survival from the first period of life to the next depends on private
health spending, i.e. p = φ (h) and it is specified as follows:
φ (h) =
{
ahε, if h ∈
[
0, hˆ
]
φ, h > hˆ.
(1.51)
When parents do not survive to the second period, their savings are passed
on to their offspring as unintended bequest. From the first order conditions
optimal health investment is a function of wealth Wt, that is:
ht = η (Wt) . (1.52)
In particular health behaves as a luxury good if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of the CES instantaneous utility function σ is greater than ε (see
equation (1.51)).
Parent’s low income status transmits to her descendants since endogenous
mortality implies that poorer people are more likely die prematurely so they
leave their offspring lower assets. In particular, intergenerational wealth
dynamics follows a nonlinear Markov process, that is:
Wt+1 =
{
b∗t+1 (Wt) with probability φ(h(Wt))
s∗t (Wt) with probability 1− φ(h(Wt)).
(1.53)
They assume that parents altruism is very high, that is:
θ > (1/r¯)σ, (1.54)
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where θ is the parameter in the expected utility function which measures
agent’s altruism and r¯ is the constant interest rate. The assumption in
equation (1.54) ensures that:
b∗t+1 (Wt) > s
∗
t (Wt) , (1.55)
which implies that agents receive a larger amount of resources when parents
survive to the second period.
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Figure 1.8: Wealth Dynamics
From equation (1.53) the expected bequest is equals to:
WE = φ(h(Wt))b
∗
t+1 (Wt) + [1− φ(h(Wt))] s
∗
t (Wt) . (1.56)
Figure 1.8 shows the wealth dynamics in equation (1.53) and the expected
bequest in equation (1.56). Poor families with a wealth level lower to the
threshold level, that is W < W¯ converge on the support [W 2L,W
1
L] , and rich
families with a wealth level W > W¯ converge to a high income equilibrium.
The long run persistence of wealth and health inequality is due to the de-
pendence of health and mortality to economic status.
40 Mortality Decline and Economic Growth
1.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents an overview of the main contributions which focus
on the effects of health and longevity on economic growth. A part of this
literature assumes exogenous life expectancy and shows that the mortality
reductions can promote economic growth in poor countries whereas can lead
to an aging of population in the rich ones. Although, this literature shows
important effects of mortality reductions on economic growth it does not
explain the mechanism through which life expectancy increases.
A second strand of literature analyzes how mortality declines affect fer-
tility decisions and investments in human capital. This contributions show
that poor countries can be trapped in a Malthusian equilibrium with a low
life expectancy, a low investment in human capital and a high fertility rate.
The opposite occurs in rich countries where increases in human capital are
associated to increases in life expectancy which in turn stimulate investments
in education. However in this literature longevity depends human capital and
does not analyze the explicit effect of health investment on life expectancy.
Finally, we review the recent health literature which focuses, principally,
on the agent’s demand for health and the value of life saving. In this litera-
ture health is treated as a commodity that agents demand to increase their
utility. One of the main results of these contributions is that health presents
a luxury good behavior. That is, when income is low, people do not spend
in health care, whereas for high level of income agents prefer to devote a
higher proportion of their income to additional years of life rather than to
the consumption.
Chapter 2
Human Capital Accumulation
and Longevity
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focus on the dynamic interaction between life expectancy and
human capital accumulation. In particular, we explore the intergenerational
transmission of inequality and its persistence through life expectancy.
The literature which analyzes the relationship between economic growth
and longevity can be divided in two groups. The first group, assumes ex-
ogenous life expectancy and shows that increases in life expectancy tend to
have a positive effect in poor countries and a null or negative effect in rich
countries. This is because starting from a high mortality rate an increase in
life expectancy is imputable principally to a decline in infant’s death rates.
Population growth rates rise rapidly, making the population younger, not
older. Rates of return to investment in human capital rise. However, start-
ing from a low mortality rate such as is found in most industrial populations,
the net effect of a further decline in mortality is to reduce the growth rate.
The second group assuming life expectancy affected by the level of devel-
opment in the country, shows the existence of multiple development regimes.
There is a threshold level of human capital: below the threshold the econ-
omy is on a low development path, while above the threshold the economy
is on a high development path. Correspondingly, there is a low steady state
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in which life expectancy is low, education is low, and an equilibrium with
positive long-run growth in which life expectancy and education are high.
Dealing with the first group De la Croix and Licandro (1999) and Boucekkine
et al. (2002) show that higher longevity produces two opposite effects: (i)
it leads to human capital accumulation since people devote more time of
their life to education and (ii) an aging of the population which implies a
reduction in the saving rate. The net effect of increases in life expectancy
on growth is positive for economies with a relatively low life expectancy, and
null or negative in more advanced economies. In rich countries the positive
effect of longevity on human capital accumulation could indeed be offset by
an increase in the average age of the workers.
Zhang et al. (2003) develop an overlapping generation model with non
altruistic parents. They show that a decline in mortality on one side raises the
saving rate and thereby increases the rate of physical capital accumulation,
on the other side it reduces the endowment of the next generations. In poor
countries the net effect of the increasing longevity is positive. On the contrary
in rich countries this effect could be negative.
The second group shows that at low levels of income population growth
rises as income per capita rises leading to a Malthusian steady-state equilib-
rium, whereas at high levels of income population growth declines leading to
a sustained growth steady state.
On this respect Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Blackburn and Cipriani (2002)
and Lagerlof (2003) argue that in rich countries an increase in life expectancy
raises the opportunity cost of current work and reproduction by raising the
future returns to human capital accumulation. Under such circumstances,
agents devote more of their time to education and have fewer numbers of
children when young, implying a higher growth rate of output and a lower
growth rate of population. At low levels of income per capita population
growth rises as income per capita and life expectancy rise. This in turn leads
to dilution of resources and results in lower income per capita and hence in
a stable Malthusian steady state.
This chapter departs from this literature by stressing the effect of longevity
on the intergenerational transmission of inequality. We start to analyze the
effect of exogenous longevity on economic growth and then we suppose life
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Figure 2.1: Longevity versus Education. Source: World Development Indicators CD-
ROM, World Bank (2006)
expectancy depending on human capital. In particular we consider altruistic
parents which leave a bequest to their children and when they do not sur-
vive to the old age leave also the saving accumulated in the working age as
unintended bequest. We analyze an overlapping generations economy where
agent’s life expectancy extends probabilistically to three periods. In the first
period agents acquire formal education, in the second period individuals work
and receive a wage proportional to the amount of human capital acquired in
the first period. This income is allocated between current consumption, sav-
ing for old-age consumption and the bequest for the next generation. When
old, individuals live in retirement and consume entirely the saving. The main
result of this model is that the economy displays a multiple development
regimes as in, for example, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002); Kalemli-Ozcan
(2002). According to the literature we suppose that longevity depends on
agent’s human capital. On this respect, Figure 2.1 shows the cross-countries
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relationship between life expectancy at birth and education 1.
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The circles are proportional to the country’s income. In particular the
black circles indicate the sub-saharian countries whereas and the gray circles
show the east Asian countries. We can see that high levels of education are
associated to high longevity. Finally Figure 2.2 shows the inverse relationship
between education and fertility2. Poorest countries show a high fertility rate
1We use the secondary gross enrollment ratio as a proxy of education (Source WDI
2006). The gross enrollment ratio is given by the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of
age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education
shown. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at
the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human
development, by offering more subject or skill oriented instruction using more specialized
teachers (World Bank, 2006).
2Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman
if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance
with prevailing age-specific fertility rates (World Bank, 2006).
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and a low education whereas in rich countries education is high and fertility
is low.
The chapter is organized as follows. The model is set out in Section 2. In
section 3 we analyze the growth rate of the economy when life expectancy is
exogenous. Section 4 extends the analysis to consider an endogenous survival
probability in an economy with representative agent.
2.2 The model
We suppose an economy where altruistic agents potentially live three periods:
childhood, youth and old age. Each adult has n ≥ 1 children which have a
probability pi ∈ (0, 1] of surviving to the second period. In particular, as soon
as individuals are born they face the child mortality rate and, if they survive,
become adults (Soares, 2005). Adult agents have a probability p ∈ (0, 1) of
surviving to the old age.
In the first period agents learn in school , in the second period work, and
in the third period live in retirement. In the working age, people receive an
income (yt+1) which is composed by a constant share (w) and an amount
proportional to the human capital accumulated in the first period (ht+1),
that is:
yt+1 = w(1 + ht+1). (2.1)
This income is allocated between current consumption, saving for old-age
consumption and the investment in children’s education. Hence, agent’s
budget constraint, in the second period is given:
ct+1 = w(1 + ht+1)− st+1 − bt+1, (2.2)
where st+1 is the saving and bt+1 is the amount devoted to finance children’s
education.
In the third period agents do not work and consume entirely the saving
accumulated in the working age, that is:
ct+2 = Rst+1, (2.3)
where R = 1 + rt+1 is the interest rate which is assumed constant.
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The total resources devoted to children’s education depends on the mortality
of their parents: when parents survive to the old age their children will receive
the planned transfer bt+1, otherwise when parents die before entering to the
old age their children will receive the planned transfer bt+1, and the saving
accumulated to finance the consumption in the old age st+1
3. Thus, parents
leave to each child who survives to the second period the amount bt+1/pin
with a probability p, and (bt+1 + st+1) /pin with a probability (1− p). Hence
the total resources devoted to finance education of each child, i.e. et+1, are
given by4:
et+1 =
{
bt+1/pin with probability p
(st+1 + bt+1)/pin with probability (1− p) .
(2.4)
Adult human capital together with the investment in children education in
equation (2.4) determines the human capital of children (De la Croix and
Michel, 2002):
ht+2 = h
1−α
t+1 e
α
t+1, with 0 < α < 1,
Assuming zero utility from death (Rosen, 1988), the intertemporal utility
function of an adult agent is given by5:
U = log(ct+1) + βp log(ct+2) +
+ φpin
[
p log
(
bt+1
pin
)
+ (1− p) log
(
bt+1 + st+1
pin
)]
. (2.5)
3This saving could be considered as the whole of all activities that an individual ac-
cumulates in young adulthood to finance the consumption in retirement. These financial
resources are available for the children when their parents do not survive to the old age.
We suppose that the saving is devoted to finance education. However this saving could be
devoted to finance children’s consumption. In this case the results of our analysis could
change.
4We do not accept the hypothesis that the total returns from the savings of those who
are deceased before reaching their old age will be equally redistributed, in the form of a
lump-sum transfer, to the remaining survivors within the same generation.
5Following Rosen (1988) the expected utility in the second period is given by the utility
of consumption if agents survive to the second period and the utility of death if they do
not survive, that is:
EU = p log(ct+1) + (1− p)M.
where M is the utility of death that we assume equal to zero.
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where 0 < β < 1 is the psychological discount factor 6 and 0 < φ < 1 the
agent’s sensibility to the resources left to his/her offspring. The first two
terms denote the utility that parents derive from consumption, and the sec-
ond two terms denote the utility that they derive from children who survive
to the second period. In particular, the last two terms in equation (2.5) define
the expected utility from the amount devoted to children’s education which
is equal to the planned transfer with probability p and to the parent’s saving
and the planned transfer with probability (1− p) (see equation (2.4)). The
parent’s intensity of altruism, i.e.φ, is the same for both types of investment
in education.
The first order conditions associated with st+1 and bt+1 are as follows:
1
ct+1
=
βp
st+1
+
φ(1− p)pin
bt+1 + st+1
, (2.6)
1
ct+1
=
φppin
bt+1
+
φ(1− p)pin
bt+1 + st+1
, (2.7)
from which:
st+1 =
β
φpin
bt+1. (2.8)
From equations (2.6) and (2.7) we get the optimal saving and the optimal
bequest (see Appendix A.1) as follows:
st+1 =
w(1 + ht+1)β (βp+ φpin)
(φpin+ β) (1 + βp+ φpin)
, (2.9)
bt+1 =
w(1 + ht+1)φpin (βp+ φpin)
(φpin+ β) (1 + βp+ φpin)
. (2.10)
Saving increases with longevity, i.e. ∂st+1/∂p > 0, since gains in adult life-
time increase the consumption needs for a longer retirement period. In par-
ticular, from equations (2.4) and (2.9) we can see that increase in p affects the
economy through two channels: first, higher longevity lead to higher saving;
6In particular we have that:
β =
1
(1 + σ)
where σ is the rate of time preference, which varies inversely with β.
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second if parents survive to old age, they consume entirely the saving accu-
mulated in the working age so that their children will receive bt+1 rather than
bt+1+st+1. These effects of life expectancy on the intergenerational transmis-
sion of wealth are in accordance with the literature on exogenous longevity
(see for example Zhang et al. (2003)). Increases in adult longevity raises the
planned transfer bt+1 devoted to children’s education, that is ∂bt+1/∂p > 0.
A higher probability of surviving to the second period (pi) or a higher num-
ber of children (n) increase bt+1, i.e. ∂bt+1/∂pi > 0 and ∂bt+1/∂n > 0,
since parents should invest in education of more children. Hence, a higher
n or pi, implies that parents have lower resources to devote to saving, i.e.
∂st+1/∂pi < 0 and ∂st+1/∂n < 0 (see Appendix A.1).
Substituting equations (2.9) and (2.10) in equation (2.4) the optimal educa-
tion spending for each child is given as follows:
et+1 =


w(1+ht+1)φ(βp+φpin)
(φpin+β)(1+βp+φpin)
with probability p
w(1+ht+1)(βp+φpin)
pin(1+βp+φpin)
with probability (1− p) ,
(2.11)
from which the expected education spending for each child is a weighted
mean of the education spending in the state p and in the state (1− p) , that
is:
E [et+1] =
w(1 + ht+1) (βp+ φpin)
(1 + βp+ φpin)
[
φpin+ β (1− p)
(φpin+ β)pin
]
. (2.12)
Thus if parents survive to the old age, i.e. p = 1, then E [et+1]p=1 = bt+1|p=1 .
When parents do not survive to the old age E [et+1]p=0 = st+1 + bt+1|p=0 . The
aim of the next section is to analyze the role played by exogenous changes in
adult longevity, in the children probability of surviving to the second period
and in the fertility rate on human capital accumulation.
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2.3 Exogenous Adult Longevity, Fertility and
Children Mortality
Given the optimal education spending from equation (2.11) above, human
capital follows a nonlinear Markov process:
ht+2 =


h1−αt+1
[
w(1+ht+1)φ(βp+φpin)
(φpin+β)(1+βp+φpin)
]α
with probability p
h1−αt+1
[
w(1+ht+1)(βp+φpin)
pin(1+βp+φpin)
]α
with probability (1− p)
(2.13)
where the expected human capital is a weighted mean (with weigh p) of
human capital in the state p and the human capital in the state (1− p), that
is:
E(ht+2) = h
1−α
t+1
[
(w(1 + ht+1)βp+ φpin)
pin(1 + βp+ φpin)(φpin+ β)
]α
·
· [p(φpin)α + (1− p)(φpin+ β)α]. (2.14)
Thus the growth factor of human capital depends on the wage and on the
variation in the adult’s mortality rate, children’s mortality and the fertility
rate.
Given the expected human capital in equation (2.14) we suppose that the
economy grows in the long run, which means that the following condition
holds:
w >
pin (1 + βp+ φpin) (φpin+ β)
(βp+ φpin) [p (nφpi)α + (1− p) (φpin+ β)α]
1/α
. (2.15)
Figure (2.3) shows ht+2 in both states p and 1 − p and the corresponding
expected human capital E(ht+2) (in particular we choose the following cali-
bration: φ = 0.3, pi = 0.6, n = 2, w = 2.7, α = 0.6, β = 0.4 and p = 0.5).
Human capital in the state 1− p is higher than human capital in the state p
since when parents do not survive to old age a larger amount of resources is
invested in education (see equation 2.11).
In Figure 2.3 hS is the equilibrium in the state p and hD is the equilibrium
in the state (1 − p). Given the assumption in equation (2.15) are both
unstable. In particular, the equilibria in the two states are given as follows:
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Figure 2.3: Human Capital accumulation and Exogenous Longevity
hS =
wφpi (βp+ φpin)
(βp+ φpin) (φpin+ β − φw) + φpin+ β
,
hD =
w (βp+ φpin)
(βp+ φpin) (pin− w) + pin
.
For a given values of other parameters, an increase in p raises the equilibrium
in both states p and 1− p, i.e. ∂hS/∂p > 0 and ∂hD/∂p > 0.
The effect of exogenous changes in adult longevity on the expected human
capital depends on the value of initial adult mortality, that is when p is lower
than a certain threshold, i.e. p∗ (see appendix A.2) increases in longevity
have a positive effect on human capital, that is ∂E [ht+2] /∂p > 0. When
p > p∗ increases in life expectancy have a negative effect on human capital
accumulation, i.e. ∂E [ht+2] /∂p < 0 (see Appendix A.2).
Proposition 1 An exogenous increase in adult’s longevity has a positive ef-
fect on the expected human capital if the initial life expectancy is below a cer-
tain threshold p∗. When life expectancy is above this threshold p∗ an increase
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in adult’s life expectancy has a negative effect on human capital accumulation.
Proof. For technical details see appendix A.2
To understand the effect of exogenous changes in life expectancy on human
capital accumulation, we analyze the effect of longevity on the expected
investment in education given by equation (2.12).
E[et+1]
p10 pˆ
Figure 2.4: Education Spending
When parents do not survive to the old age, i.e p = 0, children’s education
spending is higher than when parents survive to the old age, that is (see
Figure 2.4):
E [et+1]p=0 − E [et+1]p=1 =
φβ
(1 + φpin) (1 + β + φpin)
> 0.
The expected education spending is nonlinear with respect to longevity: for
low levels of life expectancy it increases and for high levels of life expectancy
it decreases (see Appendix A.3 ). In particular, the expected education shows
the maximum value when the probability of surviving to the first period is
equal to:
pˆ =
(1 + β + 2npiφ)1/2 − (1 + npiφ)
β
, (2.16)
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which is positive if the following condition is satisfied:
β > (npiφ)2 .
Therefore, when p < pˆ the expected education spending increases and when
p > pˆ it decreases (see Appendix A.3). Thus, when the initial adult mortality
is high, exogenous increases in adults life expectancy improve the investment
in children’s education, whereas when initial adult mortality is low, rising
longevity leads to a reduction in children’s investment in education (De la
Croix and Licandro, 1999; Zhang et al., 2003).
This path depends on the two opposite effects of increases in adult longevity
on saving and bequest. First it affects positively both the saving and the
planned transfer (∂st+1/∂p > 0; ∂bt+1/∂p > 0). Rising longevity, indeed, re-
quiring higher consumption in old age, leads individuals to save more, in
the working age, to finance increased consumption needs in the retirement.
The second effect is that when parents do not survive to the old age their
children will receive both the planned transfer bt+1 and st+1 (see equation
(2.11)) otherwise children will receive bt+1.
A higher fertility rate or an increase in the probability of surviving to the
second period imply lower resources for each child (indeed ∂E [et+1] /∂n < 0
and ∂E [et+1] /∂pi < 0 see Appendix A.2.1 and A.2.2) which in turn has a
negative effect on human capital accumulation, that is:
∂E(ht+2)
∂n
< 0
∂E(ht+2)
∂pi
< 0
Proposition 2 Exogenous increases in the fertility rate or in the children’s
survival probability have a negative effect on human capital accumulation
Proof. The technical part of this proposition is proved in Appendix A.2.1
and A.2.2
Finally an increase in the fertility rate or a reduction in children’s mortality
move to the left the turning point in Eq (2.16). Indeed:
∂pˆ
∂n
= −
piφ
β
[
(1 + β + 2npiφ)1/2 − 1
(1 + β + 2npiφ)1/2
]
< 0
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∂pˆ
∂pi
= −
nφ
β
[
(1 + β + 2npiφ)1/2 − 1
(1 + β + 2npiφ)1/2
]
< 0
In accordance with the literature (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002; Blackburn and Cipri-
ani, 2002) the model shows a trade-off between quantity and quality of chil-
dren. An increase in the fertility rate or in the children’s probability of
surviving to the second period leads to a reduction in the expected level ed-
ucation. Indeed a higher number of children, implies lower resources for the
next generations in both states.
2.4 Endogenous longevity
In this section we analyze the effect of longevity when it is endogenously spec-
ified. In particular, we focus on the probability of an adult agent of surviving
to the second period whereas the probability of surviving to the second period
is assumed exogenous. We suppose that life expectancy depends on human
capital: a higher agent’s education implies a higher willingness to invest in
health care either because education makes people better decision makers or
because more educated people have better informations about health. Hence
we define the probability of surviving to the second period as a function of
human capital:
p = p (ht+1) , (2.17)
Following empirical evidence (Figure 2.1) longevity is assumed to satisfy the
following properties:
∂p/∂ht+1 > 0; (2.18)
∂2p/∂h2t+1 < 0; (2.19)
p (0) = p ≥ 0; (2.20)
lim
h→∞
p (h) = p¯ ≤ 1. (2.21)
Following Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) we specify the probability of sur-
viving to the old age as:
p =
p+ pγ (ht+1)
η
1 + γ (ht+1)
η , (2.22)
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where the parameters 0 < η ≤ 1 and γ > 0 jointly determine both the turning
point in p′(h) and the speed at which p (·) traverses the interval (p, p). For
a given value of η, an increase (decrease) in γ reduces the turning point,
while for a given value of such a point, an increase (decrease) in η raises the
speed of transition (the limiting case of which is when p (·) changes value
from p to p instantaneously, which corresponds to the case of a step function
(Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002). For simplicity we assume that η = 1. This
function satisfies the properties in equations (2.18), (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21),
that is:
p′ =
γ(p− p)
(1 + γh)2
> 0,
p′′ =
−2γ
1 + γh
< 0
and it is bounded in p and p, that is:
lim
h→0
p = p;
lim
h→∞
p = p.
The dynamic of human capital accumulation is obtained by combining equa-
tions (2.22) and (2.13):
ht+2 =


h1−αt+1
[
w(1+ht+1)φ(βp(ht+1)+φpin)
(φpin+β)(1+βp(ht+1)+φpin)
]α
with probability p
h1−αt+1
[
w(1+ht+1)βp(ht+1)+φpin
npi(1+βp(ht+1)+φpin)
]α
with probability (1− p)
(2.23)
The growth rate , i.e. g, when ht+1 goes to zero is as follows:
lim
h→0
g =


[
w
(
1+ht+1
ht+1
)
φ(βp+φpin)
(φpin+β)(1+βp+φpin)
]α
− 1 =∞ with probability p
[
w
(
1+ht+1
ht+1
)
βp+φpin
npi(1+βp+φpin)
]α
− 1 =∞ with probability (1− p) .
(2.24)
We suppose that the economy growth in the long run, that is:
lim
h→∞
gLR =


(
wφ
φpin+β
)(
βp¯+φpin
1+βp¯+φpin
)
> 1 with probability p
(
w
pin
) (
βp¯+φpin
1+βp¯+φpin
)
> 1 with probability (1− p) .
(2.25)
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An increase in the probability of surviving to the second period or a high
number of children have a negative effect on the growth rate in the long run
in both states, that is7:
∂gLR
∂pi
< 0;
∂gLR
∂n
< 0.
This result confirms the existence of a trade off between quantity and quality
of children.
g
h
1-p
p
hSL h
D
L h
D
H h
S
H
1
E[g]
Figure 2.5: Human Capital Accumulation: Poverty Trap
The expected growth rate presents a stable steady state if both curves
in equation (2.23) show a stable steady state (see Figure 2.5)8. In this case
an economy that start with a level of human capital h0 < h
S
L or a h0 < h
D
H
converges to the interval
[
hSL, h
D
L
]
. An economy with an initial level of human
7In particular in the state p we assume that:
∂gLR
∂pi
=
∂gLR
∂n
= β (1− p)− (βp+ φpin)
2
< 0
8Our reference calibration is pi = 1, f = 1, p = 0.2, p = 0.9, η = 1, γ = 0.01, α = 0.6,
w = 2.7, β = 0.4, φ = 0.3.
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Figure 2.6: Human Capital Accumulation: No Poverty Trap
capital h0 > h
S
H shows a positive growth rate and an economy that start with
hDH < h0 < h
S
H converges to the interval
[
hSL, h
D
L
]
with probability p and grows
in the long run with probability 1− p.
Proposition 3 When the economy start with a human capital h0 < h
S
L and
h0 < h
D
H it converges to the interval
[
hSL, h
D
L
]
. For high levels of initial
human capital, i.e. h0 > h
S
H the expected human capital rises leading to a
sustained growth. Finally if hDH < h0 < h
S
H the economy converges to the
interval
[
hSL, h
D
L
]
with probability p and it grows a the long-run growth rate
with probability 1− p.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Figure (2.6) shows the convergence of both poor and rich economies to the
long-run expected growth rate.
Therefore since the distribution in the long run depends on the path of the
growth rate in the state (1− p) we focus on this state. From equations (2.24)
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and (2.25) we know that the growth rate goes to infinity when the human
capital tends to zero and that the economy grows in the long run.
The growth rate in the state (1− p) shows two equilibria, that is hL and hH ,
if the following condition is satisfied (see appendix A.4):
γ < γˆ, (2.26)
where γˆ is defined in appendix A.4. In particular the economy shows a
minimum growth rate hmin if the two following conditions are satisfied (see
appendix A.4):
γ >
p
p
,
and:
γ > γ.
Figure (2.7) illustrates the growth rate in the death state (our reference
calibration is pi = 1, f = 1, p = 0.2, p = 0.9, η = 1, γ = 0.01, α = 0.6,
w = 2.7, β = 0.4, φ = 0.3.).
g
ht + 1
hL hH
1-p
hmin
Figure 2.7: Human Capital Accumulation in the death state
It is nonlinear, it first decreases and then increases. An economy with
an initial human capital h0 < hL or hL < h0 < hH converges to the stable
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steady state hL. In the opposite an economy with an initial human capital
h0 > hH shows a positive growth rate in the long run. Therefore to the
left of hL , the economy is on a low development path where life expectancy
is low and education spending is low. The human capital level hL acts as
threshold determining the persistence of intergenerational human capital in-
equality. The following proposition describes the conditions under which the
human capital growth rate presents two steady state (the technical aspects
are proved in A.4).
Proposition 4 Human capital growth rate shows two steady states if γ < γˆ.
The low steady state, i.e. hL, is locally stable whereas the high steady state,
i.e. hH , is unstable.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
2.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we analyze the effect of increases in life expectancy on hu-
man capital accumulation. In particular, we focus on the effects of adult’s
mortality on the intergenerational transmission of wealth. When longevity
is exogenous, it exerts opposite effects on economic growth. On one hand,
an increase in longevity leads to higher savings because the increased con-
sumption needs in later life. On the other hand, a high longevity reduces
accidental bequests. This implies lower resources for the next generation.
The net outcome depends on the initial level of mortality. When initial life
expectancy is low, the positive effects dominate and hence rising longevity
stimulates growth. When initial life expectancy is high, however, the negative
effects tend to dominate and thus rising longevity tends to hinder growth.
When longevity depend on human capital the economy shows multiple
development regimes. The economies with a low initial human capital con-
verge to a stable steady state where human capital is low and mortality is
high. The economies with a high human capital show a high life expectancy,
a high level of human capital and show a positive growth rate in the long
run.
Chapter 3
Life Expectancy, Health
Spending and Saving
3.1 Introduction
Through the last two centuries, economic development gradually contributed
to the increase in the human life span. In 1840 life expectancy at birth was
40 years in England, 44 years in Denmark and 45 years in Sweden (Livi-
Bacci, 2001). According to recent life tables, in 2004 life expectancy at birth
in England, Denmark and Sweden is 78, 77 and 80 years respectively. In
particular, in most developed countries, life expectancy at birth is around 80
years (World Development Indicators 2006).
The increase in life expectancy has significant implications for various
aspects of the society. In the literature, Bloom et al. (2003), Kageyama
(2003), and Zhang et al. (2003), for example, show that increases in life ex-
pectancy lead to higher savings rates. This is because agents, in the working
age, increase their saving to finance higher consumption needs in old age
(Modigliani and Brumberg, 1980). Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) analyze
the relationship between life expectancy, human capital and fertility. How-
ever, in this literature life expectancy is exogenous or depends on the level of
human capital. Thus the explicit role of health investment on life expectancy
is not analyzed.
Some theoretical contributions focus on the willingness of people to pay
60 Life Expectancy, Health Spending and Saving
to reduce mortality risk. The willingness to pay criterion is based on the prin-
ciple that living is a generally enjoyable activity for which consumers should
be willing to sacrifice other pleasures (Murphy and Topel, 2006; Ehrlich and
Yin, 2005).
Strictly related to the willingness to pay criterion is the Grossman’s (1972)
paper which analyzes the demand for the commodity “good health”. In this
model agents demand health since it increases the time available for market
and non market activities. Indeed, a rise in the stock of health reduces
the amount of time lost for these activities and the monetary value of this
reduction is an index of the return to the investment in health (Grossman,
1972). A central result of the Grossman model is that the consumer’s demand
for health and medical care is positively correlated with his\her wage rate
and his\her education level.
The recent paper of Jones and Hall (2006) considers the optimal choice
between length of life and consumption. They show that health is a superior
good, that is as income rises the marginal utility of consumption falls quickly
more than the marginal utility of health spending.
The aim of our paper is to analyze the direct effect of health investment on
life expectancy. This framework allows us to investigate the agent’s decision
on the allocation of total resources between saving and health investment,
i.e the consumption in old age and the length of life. We analyze a two-
period overlapping generations model in which agents work in the first period
and live in retirement in the old age. Health investment is an activity that
increases the quality of life and the probability of surviving from the first
period of life to the next. Longevity depends on agent’s specific health level
which in turn offers an important contribution to agent’s enjoyment of life
(Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). On the other hand, agents can ensure a good
quality of life in the old age by increasing the saving in the working age.
Empirical evidence shows that both health spending and saving, i.e. the
consumption when old, appear to be luxury goods but their behavior is
strongly different according to the level of per capita GDP. The share of
saving on GDP appears to be concave with respect to per capita GDP. On
the opposite, the share of health expenditure on GDP increases more than
proportionally with respect to per capita GDP. The ratio of saving to health
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investment is nonlinear with respect to per capita GDP, it is first increasing
and then decreasing.
In the proposed model, the ratio of health spending to saving is equal
to the ratio between the elasticity of the survival function and the elasticity
of the utility function. We prove that the model can replicate empirical
results if the utility function is HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion)
and the survival function presents a non-constant elasticity with respect to
health investment. We show that CES (constant elasticity of substitution)
preferences don’t allows to understand the different path of saving and health
spending.
The structure of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 1 presents
empirical analysis. Section 2 introduces the general model. Section 3 dis-
cusses some possible specification of the instantaneous utility function and
the survival function. Section 4 demonstrates that using HARA (hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion) preferences we can replicate empirical results. Finally,
section 5 draws some concluding remarks.
3.2 Empirical evidence
The data used in the analysis are taken from World Development Indica-
tors (World Bank, 2006), they are for the period 1960-2005 and cover 208
countries. In Figure 3.1 we present a recent version of the Preston curve
(1975), that is the international relationship between adult survival rate1
and per capita GDP in purchasing power parity. Whereas Preston (1975)
uses the data on life expectancy we use the data on the survival rate that is
less sensitive to child mortality. This is because we are interested in adult’s
health investment decisions to improve his\her probability of surviving to old
age2. We estimate the Preston curve using a cross-country nonparametric
1The survival rate is the difference between 1 and adult mortality rate. The adult
mortality rate is defined from the World Bank as the probability of dying between the
ages of 15 and 60, that is, the probability of a 15-year-old dying before reaching age 60, if
subject to current age specific mortality rates between ages 15 and 60.
2However if we use the data on life expectancy the path of the life expectancy with
respect to the per capita income is very similar to the path of the survival rate.
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regression (year 2002, 158 countries).
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Figure 3.1: The Preston Curve: Survival Rate versus GDP Per Capita. Nonparametric
kernel smoother (bandwidth = 0.45), year 2002, n = 158. Source: World Development
Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank (2006)
We prefer to perform nonparametric regression since it allows us to inves-
tigate the relationship between dependent variable and one or more explana-
tory variables, without making any a priori explicit or implicit assumption
about the shape of such relationship. The confidence interval in Figure 3.1
identifies clearly a positive relationship between survival rate and per capita
GDP. In particular, the confidence interval is an indication of the degree of
variability present in the estimate but it cannot be used to draw firm conclu-
sions about the shape of the curve in particular regions 3 To asses the shape
of the curve we carry out a test which compare nonparametric regression
3The confidence interval describes the level of variability present in the estimate without
attempting to adjust for the inevitable presence of bias. The wideness of the confidence
interval is determined by an estimate of the standard error (Bowman and Azzalini, 1997;
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with a simple linear regression. This test indicates that the relationship be-
tween survival rate and the per capita GDP, can be represented by a linear
model, i.e. the significance test for the nonparametric regression shows a
p− value = 0.119. However, in Figure 3.1 we can see that the relationship is
not clearly linear, indeed, in low income countries, increases in the per capita
GDP are strongly associated with increases in life expectancy, as income per
head rises the relationship flattens out. This path reflects the influence of a
country’s own level of income on mortality through such factor as nutrition,
education, leisure and health expenditure. With respect the latter factor
Figure 3.2 shows the direct relationship between survival rate and per capita
health investment in 2002 for 155 countries. Per capita health investment
includes both public and private expenditures on health. It covers the provi-
sion of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities,
nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not
include provision of water and sanitation (World Bank, 2006). The relation-
ship between survival rate and per capita health is clearly positive and can
be represented by a linear model (p − value = 0.618). However, like the
Preston curve, figure 3.2 shows that countries with low health expenditure
tend to gain more in life expectancy than countries starting with high level
of health spending.
In figures 3.3 and 3.4 we examine the path of health expenditure and
saving with respect to income. The aim is to analyze the behaviour of health
spending with respect to different level of income and the relationship be-
tween health investment and saving; i.e. on one side agents, investing in
health, can increase their length of life, on the other side a high saving imply
more consumption in old age.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show nonparametric regressions for the saving on
GDP, the health expenditure on GDP and the ratio between saving and
health. In particular, we perform a pooling of all observation in the period
1997-2002 for 147 countries.
Figure 3.3 shows that both health expenditure on GDP and saving on
Hardle et al., 2004). However the confidence interval cannot be used to asses the shape
of the curve in particular regions. This is not only because the presence of bias, but also
because of the pointwise nature of the bands (Bowman and Azzalini, 1997).
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Figure 3.2: Survival rate versus per capita Health Expenditure. Nonparametric kernel
smoother (bandwidth = 0.53), year 2002, n = 155. Source: World Development Indicators
CD-ROM, World Bank (2006)
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Figure 3.3: Saving and Health versus GDP Per Capita. Nonparametric kernel smoother
(bandwidth = 0.31), years from 1997 to 2002, n = 863. Source: World Development
Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank (2006)
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Figure 3.4: Saving Share and Health Share. Years from 1997 to 2002. Source: World
Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank (2006)
GDP present a luxury goods behavior. However the path of health share
and saving share is strongly different according to different levels of per
capita GDP. The share of saving on GDP appears to be a concave function
with respect to per capita GDP, i.e. the comparison between nonparametric
regression and a simple linear model yields that the linear model can be re-
fused (p − value = 0). In the opposite, health spending on GDP increases
more than proportionally with respect to per capita GDP. The test for a
linear model provides indication that a simple linear model is inappropriate
(p−value = 0). The path of the ratio between saving and health expenditure
is clearly nonlinear, it is first increasing and then decreasing (p− value = 0).
This suggests that the investment in health increases faster than the saving
when a country is sufficiently developed. The intuition is that as income
increases, the saturation occurs faster in saving than in health spending.
Figure 3.4 compares the path of saving share and health share. We can
see that when the log of per capita GDP is very low (6 and 7) the saving
share is below the health investment. This result can be explained by the
fact that health investment covers a part of public expenditure as emergency
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aid. When income increases health on GDP grows more quickly rather than
the saving share.
It is possible to give different explanations for this luxury good behavior
of health expenditure. One explanation can be the progressiveness of the tax
schedule since the average tax rate increases with income. Others explana-
tions are based on individuals preferences. The idea is that as income grows
individual preferences extend not only on the amount of the good consumed
but also on the length of life which allows to enjoy additional period of utility
(Jones, 2004; Jones and Hall, 2006). In other words, when people became
richer decide to increase the consumption of health services to extend their
life expectancy. In the next section we propose a model based on the latter
explanation.
3.3 A general model
In this section we present a general model to analyze agent’s decision about
the allocation of total resources between saving and health spending.
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which agents live for
two periods “youth” and “old age”. At the end of the first period agents
give birth to a single child. Parents are non altruistic and when they do not
survive to the old age, their saving is passed on their offspring as unintended
bequest. Hence in the first period of life agents inherit a certain amount of
wealth as unintended bequest4, bt ≥ 0, and work receiving a constant wage
equal to w. The total resources of agents, i.e. yt = w¯ + bt, are allocated
between current consumption, health expenditure and saving for the old
age consumption . Thus, in the first period, the budget constraint of the
representative agent is:
ct = yt −mt − st, (3.1)
4The unintended bequest bt is given by the saving of the parents that did not survive
to the old age, that is:
bt = (1− pt−1)st−1.
This implies that in period t agents whose parents die prematurely have higher endowment.
In the proposed model we assume that the initial distribution of wealth is given.
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where mt is the health investment
5 and st is the saving.
In the second period agents live in retirement and consume entirely their
savings, hence the budget constraint in the old age is:
ct+1 = stR, (3.2)
where R is the constant interest rate in the period t+ 1.
Agents have a probability of surviving to the second period which depends
on the health investment undertaken in the working age. Following empir-
ical evidence (see Figure 3.2), we suppose that the probability of surviving
increases with health investment:
pt = p(mt), (3.3)
where pt ∈ (0, p¯], p
′
t > 0, p
′′
t < 0.
We assume that health spending, beyond the increase in the length of
life, allows agents to enjoy better life. Thus agent’s health level, ht+1, is a
5We suppose a perfect substitutability between public health expenditure and private
health spending. This implies that a higher proportion of government expenditure devoted
to health services reduce private health spending. Indeed, health investment, mt, in the
consumer’s budget constraint is the sum of private health investment, mPRIt , and public
health investment, mPUBt . The latter is equal to a proportional tax on income that is
mPUBt = τyt. Thus the budget constraint in the first period is:
ct = (1− τ) yt −m
PRI
t − st,
where substituting mPUBt = τyt we obtain:
ct = yt − st −
(
mPRIt +m
PUB
t
)
,
where mPRIt +m
PUB
t = mt in equation (3.1).
The idea is that if agents pay high tax then receive high quality public health services
and therefore decide to devote a low proportion of income to private health expenditure.
Otherwise when public health sector is absent, health spending is private.
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positive function of investment in health services6 (Grossman, 1972):
ht+1 = h (mt) . (3.4)
For simplicity we consider health level a linear function of health investment,
that is:
ht+1 = mt. (3.5)
The lifetime utility of a representative agent is:
Ut = u(ct) + βp(mt)uˆ(ct+1, ht+1) + [1− p(mt)]M, (3.6)
where 0 < β < 1 is the psychological discount factor, M is the utility in
the death state (Rosen, 1988), u(ct) is the utility in the first period, and
uˆ(ct+1, ht+1) is the utility in the second period. In particular, if agents survive
to the second period enjoys an utility which depends on consumption and
health level.
Assuming zero utility from death, i.e. M = 07, and substituting equation
(3.5) into equation (3.6) we get:
Ut = u(ct) + βp(mt)uˆ(ct+1,mt). (3.7)
6In particular Grossman (1972) assumes that individuals inherit an initial amount of
health that depreciates with age and can be increased by investment in health services:
ht+1 = mt + (1− δt)ht
where mt is the investment in health, δt is the depreciation rate that depends on age, and
ht is the inherited health level.
7Following Rosen (1988) the expected utility in the second period is:
EU = p(mt)u(ct+1, ht+1) + (1− p (mt))M.
Subtracting M from utility in each state we normalize the utility of nonsurvival to zero:
EU = p(mt) [u(ct+1, ht+1)−M ] + (1− p (mt)) [M −M ] .
Therefore the expected utility in the second period is given by the differences in utility
between life and death, that is:
EU = p(mt) [u(ct+1, ht+1)−M ] .
3.3 A general model 69
3.3.1 Optimal saving and health spending
Proposition 5 characterizes the optimal condition for saving and health spend-
ing:
Proposition 5 The optimal allocation of resources implies that the ratio of
saving to health investment is:
st
mt
=
εuˆc
εuˆm + εp
, (3.8)
where εuˆc = uˆc(ct+1,mt)ct+1/uˆ(ct+1,mt) is the elasticity of the instantaneous
utility function with respect to consumption, εuˆm = uˆm(ct+1,mt)mt/uˆ(ct+1,mt)
is the elasticity of the instantaneous utility function with respect to health in-
vestment8 and εp = p
′(mt)mt/p(mt) is the elasticity of the survival function
with respect to health investment.
Proof. Given the budget constraints in equations (3.1) and (3.2), the first
order conditions with respect to st and mt are:
u′(ct)
uˆc(ct+1,mt)
= βpt(mt)R, (3.9)
and:
u′(ct) = βp
′
t(mt)uˆ(ct+1,mt) + βp(mt)uˆm(ct+1,mt). (3.10)
The substitution of equation (3.10) in equation (3.9) yields the ratio between
the saving and health investment.
Equation (3.9) is the usual condition that requires the marginal rate of
substitution between current and future consumption should to be equal
to the expected return on saving. Equation (3.10) captures the trade-off
between the marginal cost and marginal benefit of health care spending.
By investing in health care, agents renounce to the current consumption to
8We define:
uˆc =
∂uˆ(ct+1,mt)
∂ct+1
,
and:
uˆm =
∂uˆ(ct+1,mt)
∂mt
.
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increase their health level and the probability of surviving to the second
period.
According to Proposition 5 the response of the ratio between saving and
health spending to variations in the level of income depends on the behavior
of the elasticities in equation (3.8). Empirical evidence (Figures 3.3 and 3.4)
shows that both saving and health investment rise with income but, when
income is high, health spending on GDP grows faster rather than the saving
on GDP. The intuition is that when income becomes higher than a certain
threshold, consumption elasticity falls relative to the health elasticity causing
the ratio between saving and health to decrease.
3.4 Alternative specifications of the Utility
function and the Survival function
In this section we analyze the effect of alternative specifications of instanta-
neous utility function and survival function on the ratio between saving and
health investment in equation(3.8).
Constant elasticity of utility function and survival function
The intuition from figures 3.3 and 3.4 is that when income is low peo-
ple prefer to devote more income to the consumption rather than health
spending, but when income rises the marginal utility of consumption ap-
pears to decreases faster than the marginal utility of health spending. We
cannot replicate this empirical evidence using an utility function with con-
stant elasticity with respect consumption and health investment, e.g. uˆ =[
cβm1−β
]1−γ
/ (1− γ) , and a survival function with constant elasticity with
respect to health investment, i.e. p = mδt . Indeed using this specification
the ratio st/mt is constant. In particular, from equation (3.8) we obtain
st/mt = β (1− γ) / ((1− β) (1− γ) + δ).
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Constant elasticity of utility function with respect to consumption
Using an utility function with constant εuˆcand non-constant εuˆm , and a sur-
vival function p (m) with non-constant εp, we have that the ratio st/mt is
consistent with empirical evidence if the sum εuˆm + εp is first decreasing and
then increasing. This specification implies that the model is intractable with
analytical tools.
Constant elasticity of utility with respect to investment in health
In a model with non-constant εuˆc , constant εuˆmand non-constant εp the path
of the ratio st/mt depends on the movements of εuˆc , εp and on the value of
the constant elasticity εuˆm .
In the next section we present a model where the utility function presents
a zero elasticity with respect to health investment. This specification allows
us to replicate the empirical results.
3.5 A Model with zero elasticity of utility
with respect to investment in health
In this section we present a simplified version of the general utility function
displayed in equation (3.7). In particular, we suppose that health does not
enter in the utility function and affects only the survival function. Thus, the
lifetime utility takes the following form:
Ut = u(ct) + βp(mt)u(ct+1), (3.11)
subject to the budget constraints given by equations (3.1) and (3.2).
Given zero utility from health level, the ratio between saving and health
investment is equal to the ratio between the elasticity of the utility with re-
spect to consumption in old age and the elasticity of the probability function
with respect to health investment. Thus equation (3.8) becomes:
st
mt
=
εuc
εp
. (3.12)
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3.5.1 Survival function
Given equation (3.3) we specify the following probability of surviving to old
age:
p(mt) =
{
p+ λmδt , if mt ∈ [0, mˆ]
p if mt > mˆ
(3.13)
where 0 < δ < 1, λ > 0, p is the minimum agent’s survival probability if they
do not invest in health services and p is the highest probability of surviving
to old age9. This means that an increase in the level of health investment
beyond mˆ cannot increase the probability of surviving10. In particular mˆ is
given by:
mˆt =
(
p− p
λ
)1/δ
. (3.14)
The elasticity of the survival function is concave with respect to health in-
vestment, that is:
εp(mt) =
δλmδt
p+ λmδt
, (3.15)
where:
εp(0) = 0,
lim
m→∞
εp = δ.
3.5.2 Preferences
Jones and Hall (2006) to explain the luxury good behavior of health spend-
ing choose to add a constant term to the standard utility function with con-
stant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.). Using this specification in our model
we obtain intractable results. Thus, we choose to use H.A.R.A (hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion function)11 preferences which present a non-constant
9Assuming p = 0.1, non linear least square estimates of the parameters λ and δ in
equation(3.13) yields λ = 0.2 and δ = 0.6.
10Empirical analysis (figure 3.3) shows that in rich countries health investment is still
increasing. This stylized fact support the idea that health investment did not yet reach
its maximum level mˆ.
11The HARA family is rich, in the sense that by suitable adjustment of the parameters
we can have an utility function with absolute o relative risk aversion increasing, decreasing
or constant. Thus, isolelastic (constant relative risk aversion for θ = 0), exponential
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elasticity with respect to the consumption. Hence the utility function is:
u(c) =
(θ + σc)
σ−1
σ
σ − 1
, (3.16)
where12 the constant θ > 0 can be considered as the minimum required
consumption at the end of the horizon. We assume that σ > 1, which implies
that the function is D.A.R.A like the standard utility function C.E.S.
Given equations (3.13) and (3.16), equation (3.12) yields the following
relationship between saving and health investment:
st
mt
=
1
δ
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
1 +
p
λmδt
)
−
θ
σRmt
, (3.17)
which implies that the saving is concave in health investment, i.e. ∂st/∂mt >
0 and ∂2st/∂m
2
t < 0 (see Appendix B.3).
The first order conditions corresponding to equation (3.11) in the range
[0, mˆ] are given by:
ct =
θ + σct+1
σ
[
βR
(
p+ λmδt
)]σ − θ
σ
, (3.18)
ct+1 = R
(
σ − 1
σ
)
mt
δ
(
1 +
p
λmδt
)
−
θ
σ
. (3.19)
From equations (3.1), (3.19) and (3.18) we obtain the following implicit re-
lation between health investment and income, that is:
F (yt,mt) = 0,
(constant absolute risk aversion) and quadratic utility functions are subsets of HARA
family (Merton, 1992). In particular:
if σ > 0⇒ D.A.R.A
if σ < 0⇒ I.A.R.A
if σ =∞⇒ A.R.A = 0
In this paper we assume σ > 0.
12This utility function shows an elasticity which increases with the consumption, that
is:
εuc =
c(σ − 1)
θ + σc
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where:
F (yt,mt) ≡
(
σ − 1
σ
)
mt
δ
(
1 +
p
λmδt
)[
R1−σ[
β
(
p+ λmδt
)]σ + 1
]
+
+ mt − yt −
θ
σ
[
1 +
1
R
]
. (3.20)
We are interested in analyzing the behavior of saving and health investment
according to different levels of per capita income. The aim is to show that the
elasticity of saving falls more rapidly than the elasticity of health investment,
that is as people became richer, saving rises but they prefer to devote an in-
creasing share of income to additional years of life. The following proposition
define the properties of health share and saving share.
Proposition 6 In the range [0, mˆ] , a sufficient condition to have health in-
vestment increasing and convex in income, i.e. ∂mt/∂yt > 0 and ∂
2mt/∂y
2
t >
0, is δ ≤ 1
σ
. When this condition is satisfied optimal health share presents the
following properties13 (see figure 3.5):
(1) lim
m→m0
mt
yt
=∞,
(2) lim
m→mˆ
mt
yt
= mˆ
yˆ
> 0,
(3) ∂(mt/yt)
∂yt
= 0 for yt = ym;
∂(mt/yt)
∂yt
< 0 for yt < ym;
∂(mt/yt)
∂yt
> 0 for
yt > ym.
Proof. The technical part of this proposition is proved in Appendix B.2.
Proposition 7 Given the condition δ ≤ 1
σ
, optimal saving share in income
satisfies the following properties (see figure 3.5):
(1) lim
mt→m0
st
yt
= −∞ if s0 < 0
(2) lim
mt→mˆ
st
yt
= sˆ
yˆ
> 0
(3) ∂st/yt
∂yt
> 0 if R > σδ
(σ−1)
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Figure 3.5: Saving share and Health share versus Income.
Proof. See Appendix B.3
Propositions 6 and 7 imply that both saving and health investment behave
like luxury goods. In particular, when income is low, i.e. yt < ym, health
share is decreasing and presents an elasticity with respect to income εm <
1(see figure 3.514). When income increases, i.e. yt > ym, the elasticity
of health with respect to income rises, i.e. εm > 1.(see Appendix B.2).
This results support some theoretical contributions which shows that the
income elasticity of demand for health care is larger than one. In particular
Blomqvist and Carter (1997) estimate that the income elasticity of health
care spending, for OECD countries in the period 1960 to 1991, is significantly
above one.
In Figure3.5 we can see that there exist a value of y so that the saving
share is equal to the health share (for the technical part see appendix B.4).
Thus when the income is equal to y the elasticity of utility function is equal
to the elasticity of the survival function.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the results of our calibration for the ratio between
13The value m0 define the value of mt so that yt is equal to zero (see appendix B.1).
14Our calibration is σ = 2, β = 0.7, R = 3, δ = 0.5, θ = 1, λ = 0.2, p = 0.3.
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optimal saving and optimal health investment with respect to different in-
come levels (our baseline parameters values are σ = 2, β = 0.7, R = 3,
δ = 0.5, θ = 1, λ = 0.2, p = 0.3). The following proposition characterizes
the properties of the ratio between the saving share and health share.
Proposition 8 When yt < y˜ the saving grows more quickly than health in-
vestment; hence the ratio st/mt is increasing as income increases. For yt > y˜
the ratio between saving and health investment decreases as income increases
(see figure 3.6).
Proof. See Appendix B.4
Proposition 8 implies that when income is low people devote more re-
sources to the consumption, when income becomes higher than a certain
threshold agents spend more income to increase their probability of surviv-
ing to old age. Thus for yt > y˜ while the marginal utility of consumption
decreases the marginal utility of additional years of life does not decrease.
This implies that as income grows the optimal composition of spending shifts
toward health investment (see appendix B.4).
s/m
yy˜
Figure 3.6: Ratio between Saving and Health Expenditure versus Income.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes agent’s decision on the allocation of total resources be-
tween health investment and saving. Empirical evidence shows that when
income is low agents devote more income to saving to assure consumption in
the old age. As income rises the saving continues to rise but health spending
increases more quickly. This indicates that for low levels of income, the elas-
ticity of the utility function with respect to consumption is greater than the
elasticity of the survival function with respect to health investment. When
income rises the opposite occurs. The intuition for this results is that as in-
come grows people become saturated in non-health consumption and choose
to spend more income to purchase additional years of life. This mechanism
is supported with a theoretical model in which agents present HARA prefer-
ences and the survival function shows a non-constant elasticity with respect
to health investment.
In the future, we plain to specify a model in which health level directly
enters in the utility function. We need to know health inequality within
countries and the effect of public and private health investment on health
inequality. This determines whether and by how much income redistribution
can improve population health.
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Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of optimal conditions
Given the intertemporal utility function:
U = log ct+1 + βp log ct+2 + φpin
[
p log
(
bt+1
pin
)
+ (1− p) log
(
bt+1 + st+1
pin
)]
, (A.1)
the first order conditions associated with st+1 and bt+1 are respectively:
1
ct+1
=
βp
st+1
+
φpin(1− p)
bt+1 + st+1
, (A.2)
1
ct+1
= φpin
[
p
bt+1
+
(1− p)
bt+1 + st+1
]
,
from which:
bt+1 =
φpin
β
st+1. (A.3)
Using equation (A.2) we obtain:
st+1(bt+1 + st+1) = [yt+1 − (bt+1 + st+1)] [βp (bt+1 + st+1) + φpi(1− p)nst+1] ,
where substituting equation (A.3) the optimal saving and the optimal bequest are given
as follows:
st+1 = yt+1
β
(φpin+ β)
(βp+ φpin)
(1 + βp+ φpin)
, (A.4)
bt+1 = yt+1
φpin
(φpin+ β)
(βp+ φpin)
(1 + βp+ φpin)
. (A.5)
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An increase in the probability of surviving to the third period leads to an increase in both
saving and bequest, that is:
∂st+1
∂p
= yt+1
β
(φpin+ β)
[
β
(1 + βp+ φpin)
2
]
> 0,
∂bt+1
∂p
= yt+1
φpin
(φpin+ β)
[
β
(1 + βp+ φpin)
2
]
> 0.
An increase in child probability of surviving to the second period has a negative effect on
the saving if pi > pˆi, that is:
∂st+1
∂pi
= −
yβφn
[
(βp+ φpin)
2
− β (1− p)
]
[(φpin+ β) (1 + βp+ φpin)]
2 < 0,
if:
pi >
[β(1− p)]1/2 − βp
φn
= pˆi. (A.6)
An increase in child survival probability has a positive effect on the optimal bequest:
∂bt+1
∂pi
=
yβφn
[
βp+ (φpin)
2
+ 2φpin+ (βp+ φpin)
2
]
[(φpin+ β) (1 + βp+ φpin)]
2 > 0.
Finally an increase in the fertility rate has the same effect of reductions in child survival
probability.
A.2 Expected human capital and exogenous
longevity
Given the expected human capital:
E(ht+2) = h
1−α
t+1
[
w(1 + ht+1) (βp+ φpin)
pin (1 + βp+ φpin) (φpin+ β)
]α
[p (nφpi)
α
+ (1− p) (φpin+ β)α]
it follows that:
∂E(ht+2)
∂p
= G
[
− (pβ)
2
− pβ (1 + α+ 2φpin) +
αβ (β + φpin)
α
(β + φpin)
α
− (φpin)
α − φpin (1 + φpin)
]
where:
G =
h1−αt+1
(βp+ φpin) (1 + βp+ φpin)
[
w(1 + ht+1) (βp+ φpin)
pin (1 + βp+ φpin) (φpin+ β)
]α
> 0
Given the following assumption:
αβ (β + φpin)
α
(β + φpin)
α
− (φpin)
α − φpin (1 + φpin) > 0,
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it follows that ∂E(ht+2)/∂p is parabola concave down which shows two solutions one
negative and one positive. In particular, we obtain the two following real solutions p1 and
p2, that is:
p1,2 =
(1 + α+ 2φpin)
2β
±β
√
(1 + α+ 2φpin)
2
+ 4
[
αβ (β + φpin)
α
(β + φpin)
α
− (φpin)
α − φpin (1 + φpin)
]
where:
(1 + α+ 2φpin)
2
+ 4
[
αβ (β + φpin)
α
(β + φpin)
α
− (φpin)
α − φpin (1 + φpin)
]
> 0
and p1 > 0 and p2 < 0.
Since 0 < p < 1 we choose the positive solution, that is p1 = p
∗. If p < p∗ then
∂E(ht+2)/∂p > 0 and if p > p
∗ then ∂E(ht+2)/∂p < 0.
A.2.1 The effect of fertility on the expected human
capital
Given the expected human capital we obtain that exogenous changes in the number of
children reduce the expected human capital. In particular we have that:
∂E(ht+2)
∂n
= −D
[(
βp (1 + βp) + 2βpiφpn+ (piφn)
2
)(
p+ (1− p)
(
φpin+ β
φpin
)1+α)
− βp
]
,
where:
D =
αh1−αt+1
pi [n (βp+ φpin) (1 + βp+ φpin)]
2
[
w(1 + ht+1) (βp+ φpin)
n (1 + βp+ φpin) (φpin+ β)
]α−1
> 0.
Thus:
∂E(ht+2)
∂n
< 0
if: (
βp (1 + βp) + 2βpiφpn+ (piφn)
2
)(
p+ (1− p)
(
φpin+ β
φpin
)1+α)
− βp > 0
which is can be written as follows:
βp
[
βp2 − (1− p) + p+ (1 + βp) (1− p)
(
φpin+ β
φpin
)1+α]
+
[
2βpiφpn+ (piφn)
2
](
p+ (1− p)
(
φpin+ β
φpin
)1+α)
which is positive since both the second term and the first term are positive. In particular,
the first term is positive since: (
φpin+ β
φpin
)1+α
− 1 > 0,
82 Appendix of Chapter 2
because β > 0.
In addition education spending for each child decreases with the number of children, that
is:
∂E [et+1]
∂n
= −(1 + ht+1)
[
β3 (1− p) p (1 + βp) + 2β2pin (1− p) p (1 + β + βp)φ+
+(βpin)
3
(1 + 3 (1− p) p)φ2 + (pinφ)
3
(2β + pinφ)
]
< 0
A.2.2 The effect of children’s probability of surviving
to the second period
The effect of exogenous changes in the probability of surviving to the second period is the
same of changes in the number of children, that is:
∂E(ht+2)
∂pi
= −A
[(
βp (1 + βp) + 2βpiφpn+ (piφn)
2
)(
p+ (1− p)
(
φpin+ β
φpin
)1+α)
− βp
]
< 0
where:
A =
αh1−αt+1 n
n [pi (βp+ φpin) (1 + βp+ φpin)]
2
[
w(1 + ht+1) (βp+ φpin)
n (1 + βp+ φpin) (φpin+ β)
]α−1
> 0
Thus a higher probability of surviving to the second period implies a reduction in the
resources for each child and thus a lower expected human capital.
A.3 Expected Education Spending
Given the expected education spending:
E [et+1] = w(1 + ht+1)
βp+ φpin
(1 + βp+ φpin)
(
φpin+ β (1− p)
n(φpin+ β)
)
,
when p = 0, it follows that:
E [et+1]p=0 = w(1 + ht+1)
φpi
(1 + φpin)
,
and when p = 1 it follows that:
E [et+1]p=1 = w(1 + ht+1)
φpi
(1 + β + φpin)
.
Therefore, education spending is higher when p = 0 than when parents survive to the old
age, that is:
E [et+1]p=0 − E [et+1]p=1 =
φpiβ
(1 + φpin) (1 + β + φpin)
> 0.
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Given the expected education spending as follows:
E [et+1] = w(1 + ht+1)
βp+ φpin
(1 + βp+ φpin)
{
φpin+ (1− p)β
(φpin+ β)pin
}
,
when p < pˆ it increases and when p > pˆ it decreases. In particular, the effect of exogenous
changes of p in the expected education spending is given by:
∂E [et+1]
∂p
= − (βp)
2
− p [2β (1 + npiφ)] + β − (npiφ)
2
,
which is a parabola concave downwards and when p = 0 it follows that:
∂E [et+1]
∂p p=0
= β − (npiφ)
2
,
which is positive if:
β > (npiφ)
2
and when p = 1, ∂E [et+1] /∂p < 0, that is:
∂E [et+1]
∂p p=1
= −β [β + 1]− npiφ [2β − npiφ] < 0.
Moreover we have that:
∂E [et+1]
∂p
= 0,
shows two solutions p1,2:
p1,2 =
− (1 + npiφ)± (1 + β + 2npiφ)
1/2
β
,
where we chose p1 = pˆ which is positive if the following condition is satisfied:
β > (npiφ)
2
.
In addition we show that pˆ < 1:
1 + β + 2npiφ < (β + 1 + npiφ)
2
−β (2npiφ+ 1)− β2 − (npiφ)
2
< 0
Therefore the expected education spending increases when p < pˆ and it decreases when
p > pˆ.
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A.4 Proof Proposition 4
This appendix provides a formal description of the conditions for the existence of a poverty
trap. The expected growth rate presents a stable steady state if both curves in equation
(2.23) show a stable steady state. Therefore we analyze human capital accumulation in
the state (1− p) given by:
ht+2 = ht+1
[
w
(
1 + ht+1
ht+1
)
βp(ht+1) + φpin
pin (1 + βp(ht+1) + φpin)
]α
. (A.7)
There exists at least a steady state, i.e. h¯ if:[
w
(
1 + h¯
h¯
)
βp(h¯) + φpin
pin
(
1 + βp(h¯) + φpin
)
]
= 1. (A.8)
Substituting equation (2.22) in equation (A.8):
w
(
1 + h¯
h¯
)
β
(
p+ pγh¯
)
+ φpin
(
1 + γh¯
)
pin
((
1 + γh¯
)
(1 + φpin) + β
(
p+ pγh¯
)) = 1,
some computations lead to:
h¯γ [w(βp+ φpin)− npi(1 + βp+ φpin)]+
h¯
[
wγ(βp+ φpin) + w
(
βp+ φpin
)
− pin(1 + βp+ φpin)
]
+ w(βp+ φpin) = 0,
(A.9)
where from the condition in equation (2.25) the first term is positive:
w(βp+ φpin) > pin(1 + βp+ φpin).
We suppose that the second term is negative that is:
w
[
γ(βp+ φpin) + βp+ φpin
]
− pin(1 + βp+ φpin) < 0,
which implies that:
γ <
pin+
(
βp+ φpin
)
(pin− w)
w(βp+ φpin)
= γˆ. (A.10)
The condition in equation (A.10) implies the existence of two real solutions, i.e. hL and
hH .
If the growth rate shows a minimum value hmin so that when h < hmin the growth rate
decreases, i.e. ∂g/∂h < 0, and when h > hmin the growth rate increases, i.e. ∂g/∂h > 0,
then the low steady state h¯L is stable and the steady state h¯H is unstable.
The derivative of the growth rate is:
∂g
∂h
= α
[
w
(
1 + h
h
)
βp(h) + φpin
pin (1 + βp(h) + φpin)
]α
[
βp′
(βp(h) + φpin) (1 + βp(h) + φpin)
−
1
h (1 + h)
]
(A.11)
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where:
∂g
∂hh=0
= −∞
lim
∂g
∂h
h=∞
= 0.
Now we study the existence of a hmin. Given equation (A.11) there exist a hmin if:[
βp′
(βp(h) + φpin) (1 + βp(h) + φpin)
−
1
h (1 + h)
]
= 0,
which is equal to:
β
(
pγh2
)
(γ + βγp− 1) = (1 + γh)
2
(φpin)
2
+ βp
(
1 + βp
)
+ γh (2 + h+ 2βp) p+
+ (1 + γh) (φpin)
[
1 + γ (h+ 2βhp) + 2βp
]
, (A.12)
that shows two solutions:
h1,2 =
1
D
{
−γ (1 + βp+ φpin)
(
βp+ φpin
)
±[
βγ
(
p− p
)
(φpin+ βp)
[
(1 + φpin) (1− γ) + β
(
γp− p
)]]1/2
}
(A.13)
where:
D = γ (1 + βp+ φpin)
(
βp+ φpin
)
− β
(
p− p
)
.
The two solutions in equation (A.13) are real if the following conditions are satisfied:
γ >
p
p
and:
D > 0
which implies:
γ >
β
(
p− p
)
(1 + βp+ φpin)
(
βp+ φpin
) = γ˜
Thus in our model h2 > 0 is the minimum growth rate, i.e. hmin.
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Appendix of Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of the existence of m0
When yt = 0, from equation (3.1) we have that:
mt = − (ct + st) ,
which, from equations (3.18) and (3.19), yields :
mt +
mt
δ
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
1 +
p
λmδt
)[
R[
βR
(
p+ λmδt
)]σ + 1
]
−
θ
σ
[
1
R
+ 1
]
= 0 (B.1)
We show here the existence of a value of mt, i.e. m0, so that the income is equal to zero.
The value m0 can be considered as the activities that agents undertake to survive when
they do not have resources. Moreover if we consider health spending as the sum of public
health investment and private health investment, we can think that when income is equal
zero agents receive a subsistence amount of resources to survive (see note 5).
From equation (B.1) we can define the two functions:
Φ1 (mt) =
mt
δ
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
1 +
p
λmδt
)[
R[
βR
(
p+ λmδt
)]σ
]
, (B.2)
Φ2 (mt) =
θ
σ
[
1 +
1
R
]
−mt
[
1 +
1
δ
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
1 +
p
λmδt
)]
. (B.3)
The function in equation (B.2) increases with respect to health investment, that is:
∂Φ1 (mt)
∂mt
=
1
δ
(
σ − 1
σ
)
R
(βR)
σ
[
λmδt (1− σδ) + p (1− δ)
λmδt
(
p+ λmδt
)σ
]
> 0,
since (1− σδ) is assumed positive from proposition 6, and Φ1 (0) = 0.
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The function Φ2 (mt) in equation (B.3) is decreasing with respect to health investment,
that is:
∂Φ2 (mt)
∂mt
= −
[
λmδt (σ − 1 + δσ) + p (σ − 1) (1− δ)
σδλmδt
]
< 0
and Φ2 (0) =
θ
σ
[
1 + 1R
]
.
Thus since Φ1 (mt) and Φ2 (mt) have different intercepts, i.e. Φ1 (0) = 0 and Φ2 (0) =
θ
σ
[
1 + 1R
]
, and Φ1 (mt) is increasing in health and Φ2 (mt) is decreasing in health, we
obtain that there exist a value of mt, i.e m0, such that the two functions intersect.
B.2 Proof of proposition 6
Equation (3.20) implicitly defines optimal health investment as a function of income.
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (3.20) we get:
∂mt
∂yt
=
σδλmδtG (mt)
(1− δ) (σ − 1)p [G (mt) +R] + λmδt [R(1− σδ)(σ − 1) + (σ − 1 + σδ)G (mt)]
,
where:
G (mt) =
[
βR(p+ λmδt )
]σ
A sufficient condition to have health increasing in income is that:
δ ≤
1
σ
. (B.4)
We have that ∂2mt/∂y
2
t > 0 if:
Rσλmδt
[
λmδt (1− σδ) + p (1− δ)
]
+ p (1− δ)
(
λmδt + p
)
[G (mt) +R] > 0.
which is satisfied when inequality (B.4) holds.
Analysis of Health Share
From equation (3.20) the following expression defines the health share:
mt
yt
= mt
{(
σ − 1
σ
)
mt
δ
(
1 +
p
λmδt
)[
R1−σ[
β
(
p+ λmδt
)]σ + 1
]
+
+mt −
θ
σ
[
1 +
1
R
]}
−1
. (B.5)
When income tends to zero, i.e. mt → m0, we get:
lim
m→m0
mt
yt
=
m0
0
=∞. (B.6)
When yt → ∞ which, from equation (3.13), implies that mt → mˆ, health share is equal
to a positive constant:
lim
m→mˆ
mt
yt
=
mˆ
yˆ
> 0.
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Deriving equation (B.5) with respect to income we obtain:
∂ (mt/yt)
∂yt
=
(∂mt/∂yt) yt −mt
y2t
, (B.7)
where ∂ (mt/yt) /∂yt > 0 if:
εm =
(∂mt/∂yt) yt
mt
> 1, (B.8)
where εm is the elasticity of health spending with respect to income. Thus health share
behaves like a luxury good if presents an elasticity with respect to income larger than one.
Since the denominator of equation (B.7) is always positive we study the numerator
that is given by the following expression:
(σ − 1) δmt
(
σλmδt + p
)
R2 + δG (mt)
[
(σ − 1)Rmtp− λm
δ
tθ (1 +R)
]
,
from which εm = 1 if:
(σ − 1)m1−δt
(
σλmδt + p
)
R2
G (mt)
= −m1−δt (σ − 1)Rp+ λθ (1 +R) . (B.9)
Thus we can analyze the two functions:
ψ1 (mt) =
(σ − 1)m1−δt
(
σλmδt + p
)
R2
G (mt)
,
ψ2 (mt) = −m
1−δ
t (σ − 1)Rp+ λθ (1 +R) .
From condition in equation (B.4) we have that the function ψ1 (mt) is increasing in health
investment, that is:
∂ψ1
∂mt
=
(σ − 1)
G (mt)
{
σλ
[
λmδt (1− σδ) + p (1− δ)
]
+
(1− δ) p
mδt
}
> 0,
and:
ψ1 (0) = 0,
lim
m→∞
ψ1 (mt) =∞.
The function ψ2 decreases in health investment, that is:
∂ψ2
∂mt
= −
(σ − 1) (1− δ)Rp
mδt
< 0,
and:
ψ2 (0) = λθ (1 +R) ,
lim
m→∞
ψ2 (mt) = −∞.
Thus there exist a value m¯ so that equation (B.9) is satisfied, that is εm = 1. Substituting
this value m¯ to the equation (3.20) we obtain the value ym so that εm = 1.When yt < ym
then ψ2 (mt) > ψ1 (mt), that is εm < 1 and the health share is decreasing in income.
When yt > ym then ψ2(mt) > ψ1(mt) and εm > 1, that is the health share increases.
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B.3 Proof of proposition 7
The relationship between saving and health is positive and concave. That is, differentiation
of equation (3.19) with respect to health investment give us:
∂st
∂mt
=
1
δ
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
p (1− δ) + λmδt
λmδt
]
, (B.10)
and :
∂2st
∂m2t
= −
(
σ − 1
σ
)
p (1− δ)
m
(δ+1)
t
.
Thus ∂st/∂mt > 0 and ∂
2st/∂m
2
t < 0 since 0 < δ < 1 and σ > 1.
When mt = 0 we have that the saving is negative, that is:
st = −
θ
σR
We suppose that when mt = m0 the saving is negative, that is:
s0 = m
1−δ
0
(
λmδ0 + p
)
−
θδ
R (σ − 1)
< 0 (B.11)
From condition in equation (B.4) we obtain that the saving behaves like a luxury good,
that is:
∂st
∂yt
=
∂st
∂mt
∂mt
∂yt
> 0
Analysis of Saving Share
Equations (3.19) and (3.20) yield the following expression for the saving share on income:
st
yt
=
1
yt
[
mt
δ
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
1 +
p
λmδt
)
−
θ
σR
]
. (B.12)
From equation (B.1)and given the condition in equation (B.11), when yt = 0, i.e mt = m0
it follows that:
lim
m→m0
st
yt
= −∞. (B.13)
When mt → mˆ we have that:
lim
m→mˆ
st
yt
=
sˆ
yˆ
> 0
Deriving the saving share with respect to income we get:
∂(st/yt)
∂yt
=
1
y2t
[
∂st
∂yt
yt − st
]
, (B.14)
Equation (B.14) is given by the following expression:
(σ − 1)R
{
θ
[
(1− σδ)λmδt + p (1− δ)
]
+ (σ − 1)σmt
(
p+ λmδt
)
R
}
+
G(mt)
[
(σ − 1) (θδ − θ − σmtδ) pR+ θλm
δ
t (σ (δ −R) +R)
]
,
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from which ∂(st/yt)/∂yt > 0 if :
(σ − 1)R
{
θ
[
(1− σδ)λmδt + p (1− δ)
]
+ (σ − 1)σmt
(
p+ λmδt
)
R
}
+
+G(mt)
[
(σ − 1) (θδ − θ − σmtδ) pR
(σ (δ −R) +R)
]
> −G(mt)θλm
δ
t .
We define the function in left side Υ1(mt) and the function in the right side Υ2(mt). The
function Υ1(mt) at m = 0 is positive:
Υ1(0) = (σ − 1)R
{
θ
[
p (1− δ)
]}
+
[
(σ − 1) θ (1− δ) pR
R (σ − 1)− σδ
]
> 0,
if:
R >
σδ
(σ − 1)
. (B.15)
If the condition in equation (B.4) and the condition in equation (B.15) are satisfied, it
follows that Υ1(mt) is increasing in mt, that is:
∂Υ1
∂mt
= (σ − 1)σ
[
(1 + δ)λmδt + p
]
+
σβδp
[
(1 + σδ)λmδt + p
]
RG(mt)
(R (σ − 1)− σδ)G(mt)1/σ
+
+θδλmδ−1t
[
1− σδ +
σβ (1− δ) pRG(mt)
(R (σ − 1)− σδ)G(mt)1/σ
]
> 0,
The function Υ2(mt) is decreasing in mt and when mt = 0 is equal to zero, that is:
Υ2(0) = 0,
and:
∂Υ2
∂mt
= −G(mt)θλm
δ
t < 0
Thus since the function Υ1(mt) > Υ2(mt) when the condition in equation (B.4) and the
condition in equation (B.15) are satisfied, it follows that the saving share increases with
income.
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Given equation (3.19) we get that:
∂(st/mt)
∂yt
=
1
m2t
∂mt
∂yt
[
∂st
∂mt
mt − st
]
where from equation (B.4) ∂mt/∂yt > 0. From equations (B.10) and (3.19) we obtain:
∂st
∂mt
mt − st =
θ
σR
−
(
σ − 1
σ
)( p
λ
m1−δt
)
= 0,
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when:
m˜ =
[
λθ
pR (σ − 1)
] 1
1−δ
. (B.16)
Substituting equation (B.16) in equation (3.20) we get:
y˜ = y (m˜) .
If y < y˜ then ∂(st/mt)/∂yt > 0, that is:
θ
σR
−
(
σ − 1
σ
)[ p
λ
m1−δt
]
> 0,
when:
mt < m˜.
When yt > y˜ the ratio st/mt is decreasing, that is:
θ
σR
−
(
σ − 1
σ
)[ p
λ
m1−δt
]
< 0
if:
mt > m˜
Thus the ratio st/mt, for y < y˜ is increasing and for y > y˜ is decreasing.
Given equation (3.17) we show that there exist a value of y such that health share is equal
to the saving share:
st
mt
= 1, (B.17)
thus:
1
δ
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
1 +
p
λmδt
)
−
θ
σRmt
− 1 = 0,
from which we study the two function:
mt [(σ − 1)− δσ]− θδ = −
R (σ − 1)
λ
m1−δt
where the function in the left side for mt = 0 is equal −θδ, for mt →∞ it goes to infinity
and finally it increases with mt if the following condition is satisfied:
σ >
1
1− δ
The function in the right is decreasing and for mt = 0 it is equal to zero and mt →∞ it
is equal to −∞. Thus since the function in the left increases and the function in the right
decreases, the two functions cross at m. Substituting m in equation (3.20) we obtain the
value y so that the saving share is equal to the health share, that is εuc = εp.
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